Caught between Scylla and Charybdis?
Changing orientations of migrant organisations in the era of national states, from 1880 onwards

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Preface

The paper by Leo Lucassen and Rinus Penninx presents the main result of an ambitious research project on the dynamics of German, Polish and Turkish migrant organisations in the Netherlands over a period spanning more than a century.

It constitutes a very relevant contribution to the study of migrants' social and political mobilisation in the Netherlands and across Europe for a number of reasons. First, the authors adopt a stimulating cross-disciplinary approach by combining history, sociology and political science. They convincingly argue that, in order to understand the present state of migrant organisations, one has to go back to their genesis, thus making sense of their individual evolutions from a starting point. Second, this paper's theoretical framework is simple but very efficient. It combines macro-dimensions that are linked to the state of origin and to the state of residence, micro-dimensions (migrants and their offspring) and meso-dimensions (the migrant organisations). Third, the comparison of three different migrant groups in the Netherlands proves very fruitful, allowing us to understand the evolution of migrant organisations overall. Fourth, a huge amount of empirical data is systematically presented in an original way. Finally, even though the paper does not pursue policy aims, its policy relevance is undisputable. Policymakers would be well inspired to read this piece, particularly when considering policies in the area of migrant organisations.

What's more, Lucassen and Penninx's results also serve as encouragement to continue developing research on migrant organisations. It would indeed be very useful to develop the same type of work addressed in this paper across the various countries represented in the IMISCOE Network of Excellence.

Brussels, 6 January 2009

Marco Martiniello

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Abstract

This article compares the development of organisations among three immigrant groups in the Netherlands – Germans, Poles and Turks – from 1880 to 2005. We endeavour to answer the question: To what extent have nationalism and the activities of countries of origin swayed migrant associations towards or away from the integration processes of their receiving societies? As to efforts by the state to influence 'its' migrants, we found a remarkably similar pattern across time, which turned out to be much less of a breach than is often assumed in the literature. The effectiveness of such efforts decreases inevitably as migrants and their offspring develop new opportunities and make different choices. Interestingly, our material suggests that for migrants overall religion or world view is a more persistent force in integration processes than any original national identity. In cases where a specific religion is defined as being an important element of national identity, we see a strong differential effect on migrants and their organisations.

1. Introduction

On 11 February 2008, the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan was visiting Germany to commemorate the death of nine Turks in Ludwigshafen. In a speech delivered in Cologne, he stated that Turks in Germany should integrate but not assimilate. This was soon interpreted in the press as an act of the Turkish state to influence who it considers to be 'its' citizens abroad. Erdoğan advised Turks in Germany, in particular, not to lose their Turkish language, their traditions or their religion. A couple days later, the minister for the Moroccan community abroad, Mohammed Ameur, declared in a Moroccan newspaper

that the Arab language and culture should be more highly promoted among Moroccans abroad. In both cases, Dutch media and politicians reacted negatively and repudiated the interference of sending states with migrants abroad.

These two examples lead us immediately to the heart of the matter we discuss in this article. Firstly, we examine the role political and religious authorities have in countries of origin when it comes to influencing 'their' migrants abroad. Secondly, we are interested in the political and religious opportunity structures in the countries of settlement that determine the amount of room for expressing religious and/or national feelings. Finally and thirdly, it is clear that migrants themselves are also an important factor when it comes to their orientation in the society of settlement. Despite differences in opinion pertaining to the desirability of integrating in the receiving societies, all actors are highly influenced by thoughts in the prevailing (national and religious) categories.

Immigrant organisations are a useful level of analysis for better understanding the intricate relationship between these three actors: the authorities in sending states, the opportunity structure in receiving states and the migrants and their offspring. Direct or indirect influence from the country of origin is often channelled through associations, and many immigrants find their place in a new society through these institutes. Such associations can be viewed as one of the collective expressions that migrants make during their transplantation process,[2] thus enabling a form of 'diasporic membership'.[3]

The role of migrant associations, however, is assessed quite differently. Some think that they block or slow down integration.[4] Others point out that such associations –
notwithstanding their nationalistic or otherwise separatist orientations – do in fact further integration, if only because they force migrants to gain more in-depth knowledge of the receiving society, and because this form of participation supposes a certain degree of trust in the (democratic) structure of the receiving society.[5] A balanced judgment about the effects of migrant associations on the settlement process, however, is only possible after three or four generations.[6]

The question whether organisations are a bastion or a binding agent for immigrants abroad has recently been complicated by criticism levelled against the 'assimilationist' (i.e. Chicago School) model of settlement processes. Many scholars believe that this theoretical model has become less relevant in the last decades of the twentieth century.[7] This difference from past experiences, as analysed by Chicago School sociologists, is often explained by revolutions in

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[2] Bodnar 1985; Penninx & Schrover 2001; Tilly 1990.
[3] Smith 2003.
[4] Putnam 2007.
[5] Fennema & Tillie 1999; see also Vermeulen 2006. According to Putnam (2007), this trust is lower in multicultural societies, not only between various ethnic groups but also within them. However, Putnam does not discuss the role of migrant association.
[6] Lucassen & Penninx 1997; Lucassen 2005b.
[7] As argued by Portes 1997, Glick Schiller et al. 1995 and Zhou 1997.

transportation and communication that took place in the latter part of the twentieth century. The change in tide is also related to the process of globalisation overall.[8] As a result, not only the first generation, but also the second generation, is assumed to be much more influenced by the culture of its parents' country of origin. This means that the first and second generations are also expected to integrate less quickly. Some even think that immigrants create a world of their own that threatens mainstream society, as seen, for example, in the case of Spanish-speaking immigrants in the United States.[9] Migration historians, however, argue that past migrants also had intense contacts with their home countries, and that, much as it does now, the sending state has long interfered with the life of 'its' migrants abroad.[10] Studies on earlier mass migrations show that the influence of sending countries is mostly restricted to the first and second generations.[11]

This paper draws together the results of a collaborative research project on three immigrant groups in the Netherlands from the period of 1880 to the present. In it, we focus on both themes outlined above – immigrant organisations as bastion or binding agent *and* the relevance of historical comparisons – and thus link our research to the debate, predominantly among US scholars, on 'old' and 'new' migrants.[12] The central question in this debate is whether – and if so, to what extent – past large-scale migrations are similar to those in the present. Scholars who stress differences between the past and the present basically put forward four factors: 1) migrants nowadays are much more different, phenotypically and culturally; 2) the structure of the economy has changed dramatically, with the effect that upward social mobility is much less likely to occur than in the past; 3) migrants and their descendants will assimilate much slower, or not at all, because revolutions in communication (internet, satellite television, cell phones) and transportation have tremendously increased opportunities to retain the culture of one's country of origin; and finally 4) the power of the sending state in controlling 'its' emigrants abroad has increased as well, thus tying them much more firmly to the sending community and encouraging a sense of diasporic membership.

In this paper, we seek to test the fourth argument by using a comparative historical perspective to view the relationship between powerful institutions in the sending state and the orientation of migrant associations. Because we know that states have tried to influence 'their' migrants abroad – at least since the emergence of organised nationalism in the nineteenth century[13] – we selected three cases from the period of 1880 to the present in which the sending state exerted a strong nationalistic influence through migrant associations: Germans (1880-1920), Poles (1900-1940) and Turks (1960-present). We have

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[8] Held et al. 1999.
[9] Huntington 2004.
[10] Foner 2000; Morawska 2001; Morawska 1991; Lucassen 2005b; Lucassen 2006; Kazal 2004.
[11] Park & Miller 1921: 150; Jacobson 1995; Foner 2000.
[12] Alba & Nee 2003; Foner 2000; Foner 2005; Gerstle & Mollenkopf 2001; Lucassen 2005b; Lucassen 2002a; Lucassen et al. 2006; Morawska 2001; Perlmann 2005; Perlmann 2003.
[13] Green & Weil 2007; see also Green 2005, Gabaccia 2000 and Oltmer 2006.

studied these three cases by taking their organisations in the Netherlands as units of analysis. The key questions for each case are: 1) To what extent did nationality as a dominant principle – religiously mediated or not – influence the orientation of migrant associations with respect to integration into the receiving society? 2) To what extent did this influence change through time? 3) Does comparing the three cases indicate an increase of influence of sending states on 'its' migrants and thus suggest that diasporic membership has become stronger over the course of time?

To operationalise these questions we distinguish between three actors: authoritative institutions in the sending country, authoritative institutions in the receiving country and migrant associations. As for the sending country, its influence can manifest itself in different ways. Some states actively try to control their emigrants for nationalistic reasons. Otherwise, states may fight emigrants who are critical towards the prevailing regime or who reject the state as such, as is the case with many political refugees. With respect to the receiving country, we distinguish between institutions of the state and the broader 'civil society' (churches, unions, etc.). To what extent did such institutions try to integrate or isolate immigrants? Moreover, was the political or religious identity of these migrants seen as hindering integration? As we will see, how migrant associations orient themselves is strongly influenced by structures in the sending and the receiving states, though they also have a dynamic of their own. We are interested to learn the extent to which, within this field of forces, their orientations have changed over the long run.

To analyse the various relationships of migrant associations with the sending and the receiving states, we distinguish among three types of associations: 1) those directly exported from the country of origin; 2) those emanating from the opportunity structure in the country of origin; and 3) those stemming from the opportunity structure in the country of settlement. In what follows, we apply this typology to the associational life of Germans, Poles and Turks in the Netherlands from the 1880s onwards, endeavouring to get a better understanding of the relationship between sending countries and the orientation of migrant associations abroad.

2. The reach of the German state[14]

Characteristics of the migrants

Since the seventeenth century, migrants from German-speaking regions – which are now mostly part of the German state – dominated migration streams to the Netherlands. The volume of the immigration decreased after 1830, though up until the 1960s, Germans constituted the bulk of the foreign-born population. Due to continuous immigration since 1600, a considerable part of the Dutch population has German roots.[15]

German migrants were not evenly distributed throughout the Netherlands. During the modern period, the overwhelming majority lived in the border regions or the urban centres of North Holland and South Holland, notably in the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague.[16] Furthermore, the share of Germans in the south of Limburg was remarkable. While in North Holland (which includes Amsterdam) the percentage of Germans was 1.0 in 1879, the percentage was almost five times as high in Limburg. The attraction of this southern border province is only partly explained by the pull of the coalmines, which only developed large-scale at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The occupational profile of German migrants was quite diverse. Many were shop owners, artisans or skilled workers who belonged to the lower-middle and middle classes. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam a merchant elite had also been established. While others did lower-skilled work, particularly women, Germans generally did quite well and were not locked in the secondary labour market.[17] This position is also reflected in this group's considerable intra- and inter-generational social mobility,[18] which is well illustrated by the situation in Rotterdam. From the 1870s onwards, the port city attracted a new type of German. With the tempestuous growth of the German industrial economy, the Rotterdam harbour became a vital transit hub for the booming industrial Ruhr area. Soon German business houses mushroomed, which attracted a substantial number of German clerks and other administrative personnel. In their wake, numerous other Germans flocked to Rotterdam, which soon became known as a place where work was abundant.[19]

In the interwar period, the composition of the German migrant population changed dramatically, especially in terms of gender. Although the share

[14] This section is largely based on Manuscript Delger 2007.
[15] Van Lottum 2007; see also Kok 2003, Lucassen 2001 and Van Eijl & Lucassen 2001.
[16] Kok 2003. In the early modern period, Germans also concentrated along the coastal region (J. Lucassen 1987).
[17] Lucassen 2004; see also Schrover 2002 and Kaal & Van Lottum 2003.
[18] Delger 2006; Delger 2003.
[19] Lesger et al. 2002.

of women had already been on the rise from 1900 onwards, the great shift oc-
curred after World War I. Pushed by poverty and unemployment at home and
simultaneously lured by the demand for female domestics, some 200,000 Ger-
man women – most not much older than 25 – flocked to the Netherlands in
the 1920s and 1930s. They were especially attracted to cities in the western part
of the country.[20] At the same time, the occupational profile of German men
had changed. They were less well represented in the trade sector and found to
be, more than before, working in the building sector, often as skilled industry
workers or in the coalmines of south Limburg. A substantial number worked
as musicians on the street and in cafés and restaurants.

The integration process in the late nineteenth century

Most Germans were labour migrants and stayed only for a short while in the
Netherlands, where they were readily substituted by compatriots. The popula-
tion most in flux were men and women working as prostitutes, sailors, ped-
dlers and musicians, followed by skilled industrial workers and tradesmen.
Only a small group stayed for good and integrated into Dutch society. This is
well demonstrated by the high levels of intermarriage among such stayers. As
far as we know, the exogamous pattern was much more common among the
Dutch-born second generation. In contrast, religious endogamy in both cities
was much higher than ethnic endogamy.[21]

     Integration can also be measured by looking at the way migrants were
stereotyped. Despite widespread, albeit rather innocent, negative representa-
tions in the early modern period,[22] throughout the period 1850-1940, the over-
all stereotype of Germans in the Netherlands was mildly positive. As such, it
did not constitute a barrier for quick integration. Notwithstanding a long tradi-
tion of popular burlesques in which Germans were pictured as stupid, rude and
uncivilised, this early modern image faded away in the nineteenth century. It
especially faded after the German empire's rise in 1871, which showcased
strong economic growth, scientific expertise and self-touted cultural suprem-
acy. More and more, Germany was looked upon as a powerful nation. As a
result, Germans were viewed rather favourably and the barriers for social in-
termingling between Germans and Dutch were low.

Sources for the study of associational life

Given these conditions, we would expect most migrants not to be very inter-
ested in establishing their own migrant organisations so as to cater to specific
cultural, political, social or economic needs. When we look briefly at the early
modern period, this hypothesis seems to hold true. At this point, the only ma-
jor type of organisation comprised Lutheran churches. Most Germans adhered

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[20] Henkes 1995; L. Lucassen 2002b.
[21] Lucassen 2005a.
[22] L. Lucassen 1987.

to the Lutheran faith, whereas the dominant Dutch state religion was Calvinism. Due to massive immigration from German territories, Denmark and Norway, Lutheranism soon became the third-largest religion (after Reformed Calvinism and Catholicism).[23] Although Lutherans were viewed with a suspicious eye by the Reformed Dutch ruling elite, their churches were 'tolerated' thanks to intervention by the princes of Brunswick and Brandenburg as well as the king of Denmark.[24] This international nexus between the German and the Scandinavian Lutheran churches found in the Dutch Republic foreshadows state interference with 'their' migrants in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and can be regarded as an early form of bi-national transnationalism.[25]

Apart from the Lutheran churches, which not only provided religious services but also were in charge of the distribution of poor relief, German migrants seem not to have engaged in ethnic organisational life. This changed during the course of the nineteenth century, however, when the Dutch Republic had developed into a nation-state. Although the number of German migrants dropped to a low level,[26] those who still chose the coasts of the North Sea as their destination became much more active in establishing all kind of organisations. This may seem puzzling at first sight, but we should keep in mind two structural changes that took place in the nineteenth century: 1) The general emergence of a vibrant associational life in Europe, which boomed after the 1850s as part of a developing civil society; Germans simply joined this new opportunity structure.[27] 2) The emergence of the national state and organised nationalism.[28] Germany is an exemplary case. From the 1850s onwards, nation-building was well underway, thus resulting in 1871's unified nation-state, led by Prime Minister Bismarck and emperor Wilhelm I. German citizenship became to a large extent ethnically defined, consequently deeming assimilation of Germans in other societies as problematic or even undesirable.[29] The principle of descent nevertheless had its limits. Naturalisation of foreigners was possible and, more importantly, citizenship was lost through emigration or by remaining abroad over ten years without registering with a German consulate.[30]

To what extent did this new German state stimulate the blossoming of German associational life abroad? And were attempts made to influence the national orientation of Germans in other countries? From the 1880s onwards, one particularly influential movement emerged in Germany to stress the importance of fostering ties with German emigrants abroad. The *Deutschtum im Ausland* ('Germanness abroad') movement's dominant idea was that Germans would always remain part of the German body and that the state should keep contact with them in order to 'export' the German nation and its culture to the

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[23] On immigration see J. Lucassen 2002, Kuijpers 2005 and Van Lottum 2007. .
[24] Kuijpers 2004.
[25] Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004; Lucassen 2006.
[26] Van Lottum 2007; Lucassen & Lucassen 2007.
[27] Morton et al. 2006.
[28] Weber 1976; Hobsbawm 1990; Greenfeld 1992.
[29] Brubaker 1992; Fahrmeir 1997; Gosewinkel 2001.
[30] Fahrmeir 2007: 66.

rest of the world.[31] To what extent did this ideological movement influence German associational life in the Netherlands?

This question cannot be answered on the basis of the available literature, which is either too specific or does not cover the period 1880-1940.[32] As there are only a few archives left of German associations, we have relied to a large extent on an extensive analysis of German associational life documented in the *Deutsche Wochenzeitung in den Niederlanden* ('The German Weekly in the Netherlands') from 1892 to 1924. At the time, this was the only German-language newspaper (that appeared on a weekly basis) on activities of the various German associations.[33]

In principle, its reach was the entire Netherlands. In practice, most copies were sold in the large cities of the western part of the country, such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht – where one-third of the country's German migrants lived. It has been estimated that in the 1930s, each week's distribution was some 5,000 to 6,000 copies, most of which was in the northern and western parts of the country.[34] Around 1900, this number was probably much lower. According to the census, Germans comprised a third of what their population numbered in the 1930s. Around 1900, in the four above-mentioned cities, only some 10,000 German-born persons were registered as permanent inhabitants.[35] We must realise, though, that apart from these 'official' inhabitants, a considerable number of temporary German migrants were not recorded in population registers. Moreover, censuses from 1889 onwards only register people with German nationality, thus leaving those who were naturalised unaccounted for. The actual number of people born in Germany therefore must have been considerably higher.[36]

Although the *Wochenzeitung* is a rich source for our purpose, it is biased in several ways. The journal was established between 1892 and 1893 by A. Prell, a German from Bavaria who lived in the Dutch town of Haarlem,[37] and it appeared on a weekly basis until World War II.[38] It was clear from the very start that Prell targeted a nationalistic, Protestant readership, so the activities of Catholic and left-wing Germans are barely covered. This orientation is well illustrated by an 1897 quote from the paper, with respect to the column *Aus deutschen Kreisen* ('from German circles'), in which news about German associations was published:

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[31] Dann 1996; L. Lucassen 1987; Oltmer 2005; Oltmer 2006.
[32] Schrover 2002; Sahner (1950) unfortunately does not cover the pre-war period.
[33] Under the headings '*Aus deutschen Kreisen*' and '*Vereinsnachrichten*' ('From German Circles' and 'Associational News').
[34] Heide 1940. The *Wochenzeitung* often published lists of places where the paper could be read, which consisted of almost all major Dutch towns.
[35] Most Germans lived in the border regions of the east, especially in the province of Limburg, but it seems that the *Wochenzeitung* barely reached this segment of Germans in the Netherlands.
[36] Van Eijl & Lucassen 2001.
[37] Sahner 1950: 118.
[38] In the period 1905-1914, the paper changed its name to *Die Deutsche Wochenzeitung für die Niederlande und Belgien* and was distributed both in the Netherlands and Belgium.

> *Aus deutschen Kreisen: In dieser Rubrik finden nur solche Berichte Aufnahme, welche gewissen antideutschen Organen keine Veranlassung zu unliebsamen Bemerkungen über die Harmonie in deutschen Kreisen geben können.*[39]

This nationalistic character is especially clear in reports about the many festivities linked to the *Deutschtum* ideology, such as the celebration of the emperor's birthday, Prime Minister Bismarck's birthday, Christmas, *Sedantag,* (which marked the victory over the French army in Sedan in 1870) and so on. The *Deutschtum* ideology, which pleaded for the maintenance of the German language and culture, was closely linked to the Lutheran (*Evangelische*) Church and was also strong in the US.[40]

In general, however, the *Wochenzeitung* was rather moderate and – despite the anti-Catholic *Kulturkampf* offensive launched by Bismarck in the 1870s and 1880s – no diatribes against Catholics are found in it. Nor did the paper uncritically reproduce the policies of the German state. Especially noteworthy is the critical stance it took towards the ultra-nationalistic *Alldeutscher Verband.*[41] Although a number of associations were clearly, overtly nationalistic, this nationalism was not aggressive towards the Dutch. The *Wochenzeitung* wrote favourably about Dutch national history and its symbols, advising readers to respect the Dutch national values. Moreover, many German associations, such as the popular singing groups (*Liedertafel*) and sports societies (*Turnvereine*) often had a mixed German-Dutch membership.

Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that the information on German associations found in the *Wochenzeitung* does not cover the entire associational field. Information on Catholics is conspicuously lacking, which is confirmed by the fact that no key members of Amsterdam's Catholic German elite – part of whom belonged to the second generation – were ever mentioned in the *Wochenzeitung.*[42] Although we know of some early Catholic associations, such as the *Joseph-Verein* (1862) and the *St. Rafaelsverein* (1872) in Rotterdam,[43] it seems that Catholic Germans were less active in setting up organisations. If and when they did, they were most likely less influenced by the nationalist propaganda of the German state. As mentioned above, under Bismarck Catholics were discriminated against. As a result, thousands – notably those belonging to religious orders – chose to leave the country in the 1870s and 1880s and settle in the Dutch border region.[44] Moreover, it was easier for Catholic Germans (as well as Jewish Germans) to join Dutch co-religionist organisations, such as churches, because of the more internationalist and border-crossing nature of their denominations. Catholic (and Jewish) Germans therefore most probably organised themselves differently than their Protestant compatriots.

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[39] *Wochenzeitung* 1897: nr. 42.
[40] McCaffrey 1996; see also Kazal 2004.
[41] Established in 1891, it was expansionist and nationalist, especially aimed at German minorities in Habsburg empire (Hering 2003).
[42] Bank 2004.
[43] Henkes 1998: 219.
[44] De Coninck 1998.

German Catholic organisations were not entirely lacking, however. Apart from the two in Rotterdam mentioned above, we know of one German Catholic association in Amsterdam,[45] though a few more probably existed.[46] Moreover, the Amsterdam organisation was probably established after 1920.[47] In Utrecht, where Catholics formed a majority among the German population, working-class Germans, in particular, did not adhere to any German organisation. Rather, the elite gathered in their own singing associations and some joined mixed German-Dutch trade organisations. They did not establish their own churches, but joined the existing Dutch Catholic ones.[48]After World War I, this seems to have changed, at least in the southern part of Limburg where a rich associational life among German Catholics developed.[49] Because this development occurred after the period under study, we will focus mainly on Protestant organisations.

2.1. German associations 1860-1920

If we consider churches a form of migrant association, Lutheran churches in the Netherlands are a logical starting point for analysis. Most were established in the seventeenth century to cater to the massive immigration of Scandinavians and Germans, especially in Amsterdam. By the nineteenth century, however, such associations had become thoroughly 'Dutch', having lost their migrant character. Many Lutheran Germans who came after 1800 therefore had no immigrant church to turn to. This became more common, as many came only temporarily as seasonal workers in the agriculture and construction sectors. To satisfy their spiritual needs, in 1861, the *Central-Ausschuss für Innere Mission* decided to coordinate the sporadic visits of Lutheran ministers, notably those in the Netherlands. From then on, this ambulant service became much more systematic and regular. Some 45 ministers started visiting places where Germans worked and lived, especially in peat bogs and brickyards.[50] Often they would use existing Dutch Protestant churches to hold services.[51] With the decrease in seasonal migration from the 1860s onwards, however, these activities came to an end.

A second Lutheran initiative led to the establishment of dozens of associations in the Netherlands. It concerned the German *Gustav Adolf Stiftung* (GAS), founded in 1832 in Leipzig.[52] Its aim was to support Protestant minori-

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[45] The *Verein Deutschsprechender Katholiken Amsterdam* (Happe 2004: 118, footnote 363).
[46] That is, unless one would define as associations the many religious German orders who built monasteries in the Dutch border area from the 1880s onwards.
[47] Personal correspondence with Katja Happe, 7 December 2007. In 1935, this organisation had some 400 members.
[48] Schrover 2002.
[49] Dieteren 1959: 105-106; Sahner 1950.
[50] Gladen et al. 2007: volume 1, xx-xxiii.
[51] Schrover 2002: 150-151.
[52] Ibid. 152-156.

ties in Catholic regions both within and outside German states. In 1853, the Dutch branch *Gustaaf Adof Vereeniging* (GAV) was set up in Leiden. The idea was to collect money so Protestants could build their own churches and schools.[53] In 1854, the twelve sections had some 1,650 members. The initiative was taken up by Dutch Protestants, but as the number of sections throughout the Netherlands increased, soon Germans joined as well. A number of them, especially those in Rotterdam, pleaded to have closer ties with the GAS.[54] After the unification of Germany in 1871, the Dutch members became increasingly irritated by the growing German nationalism.

Both the *Innere Mission* and the GAV are, strictly speaking, not migrant organisations. They are nevertheless interesting because they show how institutional influences from the sending country influenced the orientation of these associations and, in the case of the GAV, could lead to frictions between Dutch and German members as well as between Dutch branches and their coordinating headquarters in Germany.

Let us now turn to associations that were founded by German migrants themselves. The first initiatives were taken when the German state was formed in the 1860s. Rotterdam, Utrecht and Amsterdam witnessed the establishment of Lutheran and Catholic benefit societies, sports associations, the well-known *Turn Vereine* and singing societies.[55] The bulk of these associations was established after 1890, with notable acceleration from 1900 onwards, as the following figure shows.

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[53] In the Netherlands, this pertained to the southern part of the country, which was dominated by Catholics.
[54] Lucassen 2004.
[55] Henkes 1998.

Figure 1: Development of the number of Germans in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague (1879-1930) (1879=100)


A plethora of activities can be found behind these numbers. We therefore now turn to a more detailed picture of the various associations in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague, three cities with a relatively high number of Germans.

Figure 2: German associations in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague

Two things stand out in this figure. First, we note the sharp increase in the number of associations since the mid-1890s, which can only partly be explained by the cities' (moderate) growth in terms of their German population. Second, we note the low number of associations that have an explicit political aim. A closer look, however, reveals that this statistic is misleading, as most associations had implicit nationalistic agendas. Cultural organisations, such as singing and sporting societies, evidently framed their activities in an openly nationalistic discourse. For the purpose of this article we cannot give room to the manifold German organisational field, but instead present three examples that fit the typology given in the introduction.

2.2. Types of associations and the influence of the sending country

1) Directly exported from the country of origin: the Flottenverein

The brief discussion above should have made clear that the Lutheran *Innere Mission* and the *Gustaaf Adolf Vereeniging* were associations directly arising from the German context. In these cases it was not so much the state, but rather, the Lutheran *Evangelische Kirche* dominating in northern Germany and Prussia that can be considered as the prime mover. As we noted, both associations can only partly be considered migrant organisations, because it was not the migrants themselves who took the initiative.

This was different for the German *Flottenverein*, an association that aimed at collecting money for the German navy, which, in the eyes of national-istic Germans, was much too weak. The *Flottenverein* was established in Berlin in 1898 and soon became very successful.[56] In the same year, the number of members, dispersed over the country, was already some 78,000. In 1900, it rose to more than half a million and, in 1908, to over a million.[57] The enthusiasm for this initiative was not restricted to the German empire, but also gained ground among Germans abroad. It was, moreover, coordinated, stimulated and supported by the *Deutsche Flottenvereine im Auslande*, which, in turn, was backed up by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the imperial navy.

In the Netherlands, Rotterdam's Germans reacted quickly. They had already found their local branch in 1898, to be followed by The Hague's branch in 1900, and Amsterdam's branch in 1907. Influential members of the German colony in Amsterdam hesitated for two reasons. First of all, they feared that it might fuel the existing political polarisation within the German community. Second, they worried that it might encourage negative anti-German feelings in the Netherlands. The three city's sections sent thousands of Deutschmark to Berlin and their membership circled around 100 per city.[58]

It is difficult to ascertain the precise influence these associations had on Germans in the Netherlands. One might argue that due to its nationalistic character, the association would have stymied immigrants' self-identification with the Netherlands. Still, we should realise that many Germans considered themselves temporary migrants and therefore had no inclination to give up their *Deutschtum* anyway. Finally the *Flottenvereine* were typically one-issue or-ganisations, and membership (which was not extremely high anyway)[59] proba-bly did not involve many meetings or a lot of socialising. Therefore, we should not rank the *Flottenverein*'s influence on German immigrants in the Netherlands very high.

2) Emanating from the opportunity structure in the country of origin: German schools

On the face of it, German schools abroad seem to fit the same mould as the *Flottenverein*. Again, a German centralised organisation was in place – the *Allge-meiner Deutscher Schulverein* – which, among other things, aimed at founding schools for Germans through the *Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland*. The *Schulverein* was founded in 1880, being primarily aimed at Germans living in Eastern Europe. There, linguistic and cultural rights were seen as being endan-gered by the nationalistic assimilationist policies of countries like Hungary and

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[56] The movement reached its peak in the period before World War I, and was finally dissolved by the Nazis in 1934.
[57] Wehler 1995.
[58] *Wochenzeitung* 1898, nrs. 42 and 49; 1903, nr. 4; 1906, nr. 37.
[59] From the *Wochenzeitung*, we deduce that in thee three cities some 300 Germans joined a *Flottenverein* in the period 1898-1907, which would be 3 per cent of the total population. If we assume that all 300, mainly male, members were married and each had three children on aver-age, direct influence would fall on 15 per cent of the German population.

regions such as the Bukowina, Slovakia and Croatia. Although clearly ethno-nationalistic in its outlook, the *Schulverein* followed a rather moderate and liberal course, which motivated anti-Semitic and conservative members in Austria to establish their own school associations.[60]

Despite its German origin, the school associations in Dutch cities were nevertheless different from the *Flottenverein*. Founded by Germans living in the Netherlands, these schools were at least partly financed by the Dutch state. They therefore had to comply with Dutch law and were obliged to admit Dutch children, while the Dutch educational inspection supervised the quality of the school. Often German finances were also tapped, which made the conditions that had to be met even more complicated. The German state demanded that these schools also prepare students for German follow-up education, while the Dutch authorities did not admit German teachers without a Dutch certificate (which cost them another two to three years of training). Even those hired expressly for teaching the German language had to have Dutch certificates. In sum, German schools in the Netherlands were operating in an institutional minefield and therefore cannot simply be considered export products of the German empire.

These schools were mainly geared towards the children of Germans who expected to return to Germany some time in the future, though Germans who decided to stay often opted for this type of education for nationalistic reasons. In the period 1870-1920, only four German schools were founded: one in each of the three big cities and one in the border town of Venlo, near the Ruhr area. During the interbellum period, this number would increase to more than 40, half of which were situated in the province of Limburg, directly bordering on Germany.[61]

The German school Kaiser Wilhelm Schule, founded in 1897 in Amsterdam,[62] is a good example of how the German state tried to influence the settlement process of its present and former citizens abroad. From the outset, the German state was clearly involved. The general consul (Mr. Gillet) was made chairman of the board, so as to safeguard a permanent link to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin and thus to the necessary finances from the Reich. It is interesting, though, that many Germans in Amsterdam opposed a direct relationship with the German state and tried (in vain) to change statutes so the consul would not automatically be made chairman. This stance may be explained as a result of the German population's growing identification with the Netherlands or a fear that such an association would arouse negative reactions from the Dutch. The *Deutsche Wochenzeitung* stresses, time and again, that a balance should be struck between feeling German ('*Gedenke, das du ein Deutscher*

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[60] Weidenfeller 1976.

[61] List of German organisations provided by Katja Happe, 7 December 2007; see also Happe 2004.

[62] Since 1882, already in existence was a primary *Niederländisch-Deutsche Schule* (*DW* 1897, nr. 22), which had some 68 pupils in 1905 (Amrhein 1905). All lessons were taught by German teachers in German. Information is lacking, however, on what its relationship with the *Deutsche Schulverein* was.

bist') and participating in Dutch society. Two other prominent members of the board were Lutheran ministers and founders of Amsterdam's *Deutsch Evangelischer Verein* (1880), an association that was already teaching German in Sunday schools. Ministers Wiesinger and Bähr, together with the general-consul, were key figures in associational life in Amsterdam and were also involved in other important German organisations.[63] The number of students at Kaiser Wilhelm Schule increased considerably; by around 1910 it had almost reached 200.[64] According to the German inspector who visited the school on a regular basis, the school was an important stronghold of German culture, which could prevent an all too easy assimilation.

We should not automatically interpret this school as an imperialist nationalistic project. Many parents had no plans to remain permanently in the Netherlands and simply wanted to prepare their children as best as possible for an education at German gymnasium or the higher-level *Bürgerschule*. Furthermore, the German state only paid part of the expenses. The bulk of the costs were covered by German migrants themselves and by gifts from the German companies Krupp and the Railways. Moreover, the German schools in Rotterdam and The Hague show that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin did not automatically support all initiatives, nor did the consul in these cities play a central role. Berlin paid part of the costs, but its direct influence seems to have been rather modest. Furthermore, the Rotterdam school was primarily deemed useful because it meant that children of Germans working in the transit trade (between the Atlantic and the Ruhr area) might thus be more inclined to follow in their fathers' footsteps. After all, they needed proper knowledge of the German language and German trade customs. As such, the school did not so much prepare students for a return to Germany or to retain *Deutschtum*. Instead, it promoted a more practically oriented education.[65]

We can nevertheless conclude that German schools epitomised the *Deutschtum im Ausland* movement. This was simultaneously mitigated by the influence of Dutch educational authorities and by a wish on the part of Germans in the Netherlands not to provoke anti-German reactions. The schools, which mushroomed in the interwar period, were partly supported by the German state and certainly would have fostered a sense of cultural nationalism among Germans in the Netherlands. Such processes may have slowed down identificational assimilation, although the effect mainly would have concerned recently settled migrants, thus being restricted to the first generation and part of the second generation.

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[63] The *Deutscher Hülfsverein* and the *Fereinkolonie.*
[64] After World War I the number would further increase to 250.
[65] The school was larger than the one in Amsterdam, comprising some 350 students in 1924 (*DW*, 1924, nr. 25).

3) Emanating from the opportunity structure in the country of settlement: the Hülfsverein

In 1882, the German *Hülfsverein* was founded by members of Amsterdam's German elite. Its purpose was to support German migrants in need, especially those who were staying temporarily.[66] As such, this association, as well as *Hülfsvereine* in other Dutch cities such as Rotterdam and The Hague, can be seen as an exponent of an organisation established under the influence of the country of settlement. Destitute Germans, permanent settlers, seasonal workers or those just passing by (among them being also emigrants leaving from Dutch ports)[67] could not always turn to Dutch poor-relief institutions. The German elite considered it their task to help needy compatriots and, if possible, to send them back to Germany. In this respect, the scenario resembled the position in which many of Western Europe's organisations, often Jewish ones, were confronted: the immigration of poor co-religionists or co-nationals.[68]

The Amsterdam *Hülfsverein* evolved from the *Deutscher Turnverein* (1860), one of the many associations trying to stimulate national awareness among Germans abroad in the years of German unification.[69] Within this circle, the idea arose to help indigent compatriots. In 1883 it already counted 157 members, with the bulk of the money coming from wealthy Germans.[70] The German state did offer some support to poor citizens in the Netherlands, but only incidentally gave money. In principle, destitute Germans were deported by the Dutch police. The police then handed them over to the German authorities, provided they could prove that the person in question was a German citizen.[71]

The *Hülfsverein*'s main tasks were to help provide employment, accommodation, food, clothing, medical support and travel costs. The ultimate aim was to send Germans back to the *Heimat* as soon as possible, and the *Hülfsverein* regularly asked the German press to discourage Germans to come to Amsterdam. As poor relief was only meant for those who stayed temporarily, elderly indigent Germans who lived in Amsterdam permanently were excluded. During its existence, the *Hülfsverein* therefore created a number of sub-organisations, some of which had their seat in Germany. Such was the case of the *Friedrich Stiftung* (Wiesbaden 1888), which was founded by wealthy return migrants from the Netherlands who wanted to do something for widows

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[66] Delger (2008) consulted the archive of the Amsterdam *Hülfsverein* through the Stichting Amsterdams Oecumenisch Centrum (www. moc-dhv.org). The archive, which contained annual reports for the period 1882-1930, was consulted at Stadhouderskade 159 in Amsterdam.

[67] Especially in Rotterdam; see Henkes 1998 and Van Schip 1996.

[68] Feldman 2003; Green 1986. For the US see an interesting study on the Industrial Removal Office, which was created by American Jews to disperse Russian Jews (Rockaway 1998).

[69] See also Schrover 2002.

[70] The *Hülfsverein* was closely linked to the general *Deutsche Verein* (German association) in Amsterdam, though it was, in principle, independent.

[71] Van Eijl 2005.

abroad and the elderly. Another foundation built some 56 houses for Germans or part Germans who had insufficient means to support themselves.[72]

In Rotterdam we find a similar German organisation in Rotterdam, where in 1903 a chapter was established of the worldwide association of German clerks. This organisation's primary tasks were to mediate in labour disputes, find people employment and provide benefits in instances of sickness and unemployment.[73] There were more such international associations, such as the waiters union (1878), which also had local chapters. In The Hague and Scheveningen, alone, the union mediated between 1,000 and 2,000 workers a year.[74]

3. The Polish case

The second group to look at in more detail are the Poles, who settled in south Limburg's mining region from 1907 onwards. What makes this group especially interesting is the vibrant nationalism they showed abroad and their state's proactive stance when it came to – what it regarded as – its citizens in the diaspora. The Polish state was reinstalled in 1918, after a period of almost 125 years during which its territory was divided among Prussia (later Germany), Austria-Hungary and Russia. Polish ethno-national identity developed from the sixteenth century onwards, first among the landed gentry, but later on also among city dwellers. The majority of Polish speakers living in the countryside joined only in the course of the nineteenth century. From that time onwards, Polish-speaking minorities in these empires became active propagators of their own national identity. Political movements emerged, aiming to restore Poland as an independent state, while Poles were also being encouraged to retain their language, religion and culture.[75] This was fuelled by political exiles in countries like France. There, part of the intellectual elite settled after a failed uprising against the Russian occupier in 1830, followed by a new wave after the uprising of 1863.[76] Mass overseas emigration of Poles from all three empires started in the 1870s and, in total, some 2.5 million Poles (many of whom were Jewish) left for the US and other overseas destinations. This movement lasted until 1914.[77]

Poles in Prussia (Posen, Silesia, West Prussia and East Prussia) developed an even stronger nationalism in reaction to attempts by Prussian authorities to 'Germanise' the Polish territories. Such attempts entailed both the re-

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[72] The *Niederländisch-Deutsche Stiftung* was founded by the philantropist P.W. Jansen in 1894 (Gemeente Archief Amsterdam, Archief van de Nederlandsche Woningstichting).

[73] The *Deutschnationaler Handlungs-Gehilfen-Verband* (1898) soon had almost 100,000 members worldwide. (*DW*, 1907, nr. 21)

[74] The *Deutscher Kellner Bund Union Ganymèd* (Schrover 2002: 201).

[75] Praszalowicz 2007.

[76] In total, some 30,000 Poles fled the Russian part of former Poland in the period 1831-1871.

[77] It is estimated that around 30 per cent of them returned.

pression of Polish nationalism and the encouraging of German settlement in the eastern parts of the Reich. From the 1870s onwards, some 850,000 went to Berlin and Brandenburg, and about half a million people from Polish territories left the area to take up employment in the Ruhr area's coalmines.[78] There, the emigrants would soon develop a vibrant nationalistic associational life, which included thousands of Polish organisations.[79]

Characteristics of the migrants

The first Polish migrants may have arrived in the Dutch mining region as early as 1899, when the Oranje Nassau mine in the town of Heerlen opened. The mine immediately pulled workers from the Ruhr area, where, at that time, hundred of thousands of Polish-speaking miners had settled.[80] The inflow to the Dutch mines was modes. At the outbreak of World War I, some 200 miners with their families were counted. Most of them originated from Wielkopolska (Posnania) and Silesia. Their contracts in the Ruhr area had expired. They found employment in Heerlen, Kerkrade, Speckholzerweide, Terwinselen and Schaesberg.[81] During World War I, the Polish community grew further due to an inflow of Polish deserters from Germany. At the same time, some 1,500 Polish civilian refugees who evaded forced labour in Germany, lived in the western part of the Netherlands, mostly in Rotterdam.

The end of World War I and the beginning of the Weimar Republic brought significant changes to the Polish communities in the industrial region of the Ruhr. Between 1918 and 1928, about 400,000 Poles returned to the newly reinstalled Republic of Poland or migrated to France.[82] The occupation of the Ruhr area by French and Belgian troops from 1923 to 1925 proliferated stereotypes of Poles being disloyal to the German nation. Layoffs compelled many Polish families to depart for France, Belgium and the Netherlands, where they were joined by Poles who migrated directly from Poland. The Polish community in Limburg's Dutch mining region thus started to grow in the 1920s and, around 1930, totalled over 4,000.[83]

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[78] See also Praszalowicz 2003.
[79] Lucassen 2005b: 59-66; Oenning 1991.
[80] Wojciechowski 2000: 20-21.
[81] Based on Ignacazk's manuscript; see also Brassé & Van Schelven 1980.
[82] Ponty 1988.
[83] Versteegh 1994: 164. This number is confirmed by information from the Polish consulate (manuscript Ignaczak).

Table 1: Number of Polish miners in the Limburg mining area (1919-1930)

Year	Number of Polish miners	% of all foreign miners
1919	105	2.8
1920	147	2.3
1921	153	2.5
1922	164	2.6
1923	135	2.1
1924	132	2.4
1925	302	4.6
1926	555	7
1927	957	10.5
1928	1,017	10.9
1929	1,301	11.1
1930	1,257	10.5
1931	1,197	
1932		
1933		
1934		
1935		
1936	478	

Sources: Versteegh, *De onvermijdelijke afkomst*: 167; Wojciechowski, *Voor brood en vrijheid*: 55

According to a 1928 account by a Polish priest, there were about 2,000 Poles in Limburg, scattered over 25 locations. Seventy per cent had their families with them, whereas about one in ten was waiting for their families to arrive. The rest were single men. About three-quarters of the Poles in Limburg had been born and raised in Germany, though they opted for Polish citizenship after World War I and left to find employment in France. After a few years, they arrived in the Netherlands. Less than 10 per cent had been living in the Netherlands for ten or fifteen years and, according to the priest's account, they had lost almost all contact with their home country. An equal number came straight from Poland, predominantly from the mining region of Upper Silesia. They were joined by secondary emigrants from France, who originated from the vicinity of Jarocin, Rawicz, Ostrów and other towns and villages in Poznan, as well as a handful of families from the Congress Poland, Lesser Poland and Pomerania. The priest noted that about 80 per cent of the Polish emigrants considered their stay in Limburg temporary. Some intended to return to France, and a few even to Germany. Those, though, who imagined their future in the Netherlands built houses and married Dutch partners. The occupational makeup of the Polish colony was categorical: 98 per cent were miners, the rest

tailors and six individuals had already joined the local *petit-bourgeoisie*, being café leaseholders.[84]

In August 1929, the Polish Emigration Office recruited 500 workers (300 of whom were married, the rest single) to be employed as hewers and apprentice hewers in the state mines of Dutch Limburg. Such jobs were attractive because the Polish-Dutch Trade and Navigation Treaty of 30 May 1924 guaranteed equal treatment to labourers employed in the Netherlands. Qualifications demanded by the mines included certified experience in the mining industry, an identity card and a tax certificate. Workers accompanied by their families were additionally expected to produce a marriage certificate and a copy of a document from the registry that included a photograph of their wife and any children under age fourteen. Candidates were also required to present an official certificate of morality valid for the last ten years and have a command of Dutch or German. A representative of the prospective Dutch employer participated in a final round of recruiting candidates who had been submitted by the Polish state labour agency. Candidates were eventually tested by a Dutch medical doctor, after which point the miners signed their labour contract. The emigration office requested labour agencies to take necessary steps to complete a successful recruitment and the eventual departure of workers to the Netherlands. Dutch employers covered travel fees and provisions and, upon expiry of a contract, the cost of return travel.

The great economic depression did not spare the Netherlands or the Dutch mining industry. As a consequence, some Poles hit the road again, returning to Poland or trying their luck in the neighbouring industrial regions of France and Belgium. Thus, the number of Poles (and their family members) in Limburg decreased from over 4,000 in 1930 to 3,500 in 1933. With massive layoffs, more Poles left and, in 1935, the Polish colony in Limburg consisted of about 550 families. In relative terms, Poles constituted the largest emigrant community in the multi-ethnic Limburg, followed by Yugoslavs, Austrians, Belgians, Czechs, Italians and Hungarians.[85] In 1938, Limburg still had approximately 2,500 Polish citizens, 482 of whom were men employed in the mining and agriculture industries. Most of them would stay permanently in the Netherlands and integrate over the long run.[86]

The Polish state and the Polonia

From 1918 onwards, a strong ethnic nationalism developed among Poles, excluding Jews, Germans and other minorities who were not considered part of the imagined Polish-Catholic nexus. One might have expected the state to thus be interested in retaining 'Polishness' abroad, in the spirit of the German *Deutschtum im Ausland.* To a certain extent, this is indeed what happened. At the same time, however, the state had from the very start pursued an active emi-

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[84] Ignaczak manuscript, chapter 3.
[85] *Polak w Holandii i Belgii* (PwHiB) no. 12, 1935: 3.
[86] Brassé & Van Schelven 1980.

gration policy, which came in reaction to a high level of unemployment (three to five million) at home. Poland therefore signed various bi-national contracts with countries – France (1919), the Netherlands (1925) and Germany (1926) – to which a steady outflow of Polish workers would be guaranteed.[87] The bulk of the population (half a million) went to France, while much smaller numbers went to Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. The bi-national treaties stipulated the conditions under which they had to work and granted them various social rights.

Moreover, negotiations on the precise Polish borders, which lasted until 1921, and the provisions in the Versailles Treaty on the status and right of national minorities (Poles in Germany, Germans in Poland, etc.) heightened sensitivity for ethnic differences and encouraged the ideal of an ethnic homogeneous population. In Poland the National Party (*Stronnictwo Narodowe*) played the ethnic 'card' to soon develop into a leading political power.[88] The Versailles Minority Treaty is key for understanding the willingness of the Polish state to subsidise schools and cultural organisations for Poles abroad during the interbellum period. This document guaranteed all minorities a right to their own schools, language and cultural institutions.

Also at play were counter-forces against a radical ethno-national interpretation of 'Polishness'. The leading figure was Admiral Josef Piłsudski, who was Poland's president until 1923 and, in 1926, staged a coup to remain in power until his death in 1935. Piłsudski was a former socialist who had developed a more nationalistic profile, without adopting the ethno-nationalism of the National Party. Piłsudski and his *Sanacja* (meaning 'sanation' or 'healing') regime took a liberal stance with respect to minorities, including Jewish Poles, and favoured a French republican definition of citizenship. This encouraged state assimilation instead of ethnic assimilation. Furthermore, Piłsudski tried to limit the power of the Catholic Church, despite its huge influence on the 65 per cent of Poles who adhered to this denomination.[89] One of the consequences was that the state did not automatically support the Catholic initiative of the 'Polish Protection of Countrymen Abroad', led by primate August Hlond (instated in 1926),[90] which aimed to make Polish priests and teachers available to all emigrants. Rather limited, therefore, were contributions to such non-governmental organisations by the Polish Ministry of Labour and Welfare and, from 1932 onwards, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The tension between Piłsudski and Hlond, as the major players in this power game, dominated the two conferences of Poles Abroad (*Swiatpol*) in 1929 and 1935.[91] In 1925, a concordat was signed that named the Catholic Church the leading denomination and granted it supervision over religious

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[87] Ponty 1988: 35-39. For the exact text of the French-Polish treaty of 3 September 1919, see Ponty 1988: 395-398.
[88] Praszalowicz 2007: 263.
[89] The rest were Jews, Protestants or Russian Orthodox (Davies 1982: II, 404).
[90] Ponty 1988: 237.
[91] Ibid.: 276-277, 419.

teachings at schools, including those outside of Poland. Piłsudski could thus not exclude Hlond and the nationalist Catholicism he represented from participating in the conference. A number of compromises were therefore inevitable. In 1929, when 97 delegates from eighteen countries (including one delegate from the Netherlands) gathered in Warsaw, clericals and anti-clericals agreed that it was necessary to encourage the growth of Polish schools, while the need for pastoral care was somewhat downplayed. The fierce ethnic nationalism was in this sense mitigated, and the conference stressed that cultural 'Polishness' had to be reconciled with loyalty to a host country. This reflected the actual assimilation of Poles in the US[92] as well as in France. Still, Poles abroad were asked to hold on to their 'Polishness' as much as possible.

In 1934, the second *Swiatpol* conference took place, again with Piłsudski and Hlond as protectorates. They both stressed the national unity among the Poles abroad, although delegates from the US (by far the largest faction of *Swiatpol*) demanded a degree of self-government and instead proposed an 'ideological-cultural unity'.[93] Again, a clear line was drawn between the cultural and civic assimilation of Poles abroad by stressing that they should assimilate in the civic domain though still retain their national consciousness. *Swiatpol* seems to have been mainly interested in Polish communities in neighbouring countries (such as Czechoslovakia, Germany, Lithuania and France),[94] which received, by far, most of the money which was spent on Polish education. A number of non-governmental organisations, especially those of a Catholic or an extreme nationalist nature, remained independent of *Swiatpol*.

Polish associations 1910-1940

Following the tradition in the Ruhr area, it did not take long before the first association was established in the Netherlands. In 1910, the Roman Catholic association *Jednosc* ('Unity') – with Saint Adelbert as its protector – was established in Treebeek (Brunssum) in the presence of 25 Polish men.[95] *Jednosc*, given the same name as the first association founded in the Ruhr area in 1877, strove for the preservation of the Polish language, culture and identity. *Jednosc* was to play an active role in the years to come and its membership was restricted to males

Apart from the founding of the Gymnastics Society Falcon in 1916 in the town of Hoensbroek and a small number of miners clubs, up until 1927, not much seemed to transpire on the associational front in Limburg. The number of Polish miners was low and only when the population started to grow – from around 132 miners (plus their families) in 1925 to almost one

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[92] See also Smith 2003: 744-745.
[93] Lusinski 1998: 92. The divergent position of Poles in the US has been stressed by many scholars. Most children of Polish migrants there were not interested in Polish language classes and were eager to shed any traces of the Old World; see Zimmerman 2002.
[94] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs administered its activities through the consular service (Lusinski 1998: 111).
[95] Wojciechowski 2000.

thousand two years later – the number of Polish associations increased rapidly (figure 3). They were centred around the 'Polish house' in the mining town of Brunssum. Most of the newcomers were recruited in Poland (Upper Silesia) and added fresh blood to the tiny community.[96]

Figure 3: Founding years of Polish associations in Limburg (1910-1946)

Source: Wojciechowski, *Voor brood en vrijheid*: 119-128

Associations emanating from the opportunity structure in the country of origin: the Polish school

The establishment of the Polish school in Brunssum in 1928 illustrates the influence of the sending state on Polish associations in Limburg. As in the adjoining Belgian mining area, the miners took self-initiative.[97] In the Netherlands, it all started in 1926 with a request of Brunssum's Polish miners to Hlond to provide them with a Polish priest. Hlond asked the Polish mission in Brussels to mediate. The mission, however, was reluctant to finance a priest, being only willing to facilitate regular visits to the Polish community by a priest who would commute from Belgium. Requests for a Polish school were received with similar hesitation. Moreover, the local Dutch Catholic clergy also rejected the idea of Polish priests and teachers. Such foreign influences, even for co-religionists, were deemed dangerous. It was feared that once such a precedent was established, other groups such as Protestants and socialists would follow with their demands. The clergy finally gave in under pressure of

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[96] Brassé & Van Schelven 1980: 38-39; Bekman 1940.
[97] Caestecker 1991: 539.

the Polish state and upon realisation that deprivation of a Polish education and counsel from Polish priests could in fact lead to socialism, as occurred in France. In the end, the Polish state became a major actor in founding a Polish school and invigorating Polish associational life in Limburg. Thus, the relatively affluent Limburg mining community would create an elite that became a magnet for Polish miners in the Ruhr area, who otherwise suffered under strong Germanisation influences.[98]

After mediation by the Polish Consulate in the Netherlands with the local school boards, dominated by the Catholic clergy, in 1928 the first Polish primary school opened its doors in Brunssum, and soon welcomed a relatively high number of students. Furthermore, Polish language courses were organised in other places without such a school, which also attracted a lot of children (see table 2).

Table 2: Number of children at the Polish school in Brunssum and children enrolled in Polish language courses in the mining district

Year	Children at the Stanislas Kostka School	Number of teachers	Children following language courses	Total number of Poles in Limburg
1928	34	1	?	2,000
1929	98	3	?	
1930	134	3	120	4,074
1931	190	4	149	
1932	?	?	?	
1933	208	4	184	3,500
1934	?	?	?	
1935	?	?	?	
1936	?	?	288	
1937	?	?	?	
1938	?	?	231	2,500

Source: Manuscript Ignaczak

It is important to note that, initially, the Stanislas Kostka School in Brunssum was entirely financed and controlled by the Polish state and that the Catholic Mission played a minor role. The main language was Polish, the teachers were Polish and the curriculum followed Polish national standards. However, Dutch language lessons – taught by the school director – were not entirely lacking. The Polish Ministry of Education and Religion deemed it important for children to get jobs in Limburg. Although in October 1932, Dutch authorities took over schools from the Polish state, schools held onto their Polish charac-

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[98] Lucassen 2005b; Peters-Schildgen 2003.

teristics until World War II – at which point all Polish institutions and cultural expressions were forbidden by the German occupier.

The Stanislas Kostka School illustrates an interesting dynamic: it started with an initiative from below, which was soon taken up by the Polish state, much more so than the Polish Catholic Church. Not only did the state finance the Polish education, it also took the lead in negotiating with Dutch authorities. It seems, moreover, that the interests of the miners and the Polish state converged considerably and worked to reinforce each other.

Associations emanating from the opportunity structure in the country of settlement: Polish cultural life in Limburg

As we saw in table 2, the number of Polish associations in Limburg increased rapidly at the end of the 1920s and boomed in the 1930s. This was not only caused by the enthusiasm engendered by 1929's first conference of Poles abroad, but probably more so by the increase of the number of Polish miners, most of whom came from the German Ruhr area. They had known a dense associational life for decades, which was now transplanted to the Netherlands.[99] Most of these associations were cultural or sports clubs, characterised by a vigorous patriotic spirit. Singing societies, theatre groups, gymnastics societies and Catholic associations facilitating mutual help were the core of the Polish 'civil society' in the mining industry. These clubs mobilised a large part of the Polish population and created a cohesive network of 'ethnic identity organisations'.[100] All these organisations were coordinated by the Union of Polish Associations in the Netherlands, which was founded in 1929 by the Consul General of the Polish Republic in Rotterdam. The biweekly newspaper *A Pole in the Netherlands* (*APN*) served as the Consul General's own organ for communication. It was distributed free of charge, as a supplement to the Catholic *Sunday Gazette* (*Gazeta Niedsielna*). This paper was widely read and, in 1931, had a thousand subscribers. Although the consulate subsidised the *APN*, it had to share control with the Catholic Church. In 1935, however, the vice consul forced the priest in charge to leave the journal and, from then on, the APN became the official organ of the Union of Polish Societies.[101] Through the consular office, the Polish state could now thus fully exercise a form of remote control over its emigrants abroad.

Just as the *Deutsche Wochenzeitung* did for Germans in the Netherlands, the *APN* systematically published articles about the life of Polish associations in Limburg. It also paid considerable attention to nationalistic expressions, such as Marshal Piłsudski 'name day', the anniversary of the return of Silesia, national independence day and so on. Furthermore, it encouraged Poles to

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[99] As has been remarked of Poles in Belgian coalmines during the 1920s and 1930s (Beyers 2007: 44-46); see also Caestecker 1991.

[100] Fennema 2004.

[101] In that same year, the APN changed to 'A Pole in the Netherlands and Belgium' (*Polak w Holandi i Belgii*); in 1938 Luxemburg was added as well.

donate money to various kinds of projects in Poland. One of these was the Fund for Maritime Defence, quite similar to the *Flottenverein* initiative taken up by Germans some 40 years earlier. In short, the *APN* and the associations stimulated a spirit of national awareness among Poles in the diaspora, which was also supported by the Polish state and the Catholic Church.

During the economic crisis of the 1930s, the number of Poles in Limburg decreased, but the associational flame kept burning. Polish associations declared the intention to double their membership as a patriotic gesture to Marshal Piłsudski, and many kept up contributions for Polish causes, such as the flood victims in 1934. In the same year, the patriotic zeal was further heightened by the wide coverage of 1935's *Second Congress of Poles Abroad*, which included participated by the chairman of the Union of Polish Societies. The dense nature of Polish associations is further illustrated by the high percentage of children who participated in Polish-language courses (almost 50 per cent around 1935) and the high membership rates. In 1933, for example, total membership in Limburg was 552. When we deduce dual and triple memberships, the total number of Poles (mainly males) who belonged to at least one organisation was 438 – that is, 12 per cent of all Poles (including men, women and children).

The constant friction between the Polish state, represented by the consulate, and the Catholic Church, represented by the Catholic Mission in Brussels and Polish priests in the mining area, did not split the Polish population. The large majority was both nationalist *and* fervently Catholic, and the church played an important role in cementing this basically working-class community, as was the case with the Irish in England.[102] Unlike the Irish, however, Poles in Limburg lived in a homogeneous region and they expressed true gratitude for this 'garden of Catholicism'. It is remarkable, therefore, that the Netherlands' intense Polish associational life – with its stress on nationalism and focus on the home country – displayed the same features as Polish life in Germany, where these two key elements of Polish identity were in fact repressed. It seems that the imported tradition (from the Ruhr area), combined with the strong influence of the Polish state and its organised nationalism, worked to produce a rather uniform formation of Polish life in the first phase of settlement.

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[102] Belchem 2002; see also Belchem & Tenfelde 2003.

4. The Turkish case

4.1. Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands: context and development

A brief history of migration

The arrival of Turkish migrants started slowly in the first half of the 1960s – at this point on migrants' own initiative. The booming Fordist economy of the Netherlands in that period needed hands, particularly those of low-skilled manual workers. After the Dutch government concluded a recruitment agreement with Turkey in 1964, the numbers increased significantly. Turkish migrants came through the official channel and also continued to arrive on their own accord. The number of Turks grew from a mere 1,200 in 1964 to more than 53,000 by the end of 1973. It was in this year that the first oil crisis led to an almost immediate stop of recruitment and workers' entrance into the Netherlands became much more difficult.[103]

The recruitment stop and the deteriorating labour market situation – a consequence of the restructured Dutch economy in the late 1970s – did not reduce immigration. The Turkish workers did not return to Turkey, as was expected. Instead, they started to bring their families to the Netherlands, a practice not strongly restricted by immigration rules at the time (as it would be later). At the same time, their continued stay was encouraged by a rule stipulating that a return to Turkey would mean the complete loss of re-entrance rights. As a consequence, the Turkish population in the Netherlands more than doubled in 1980 to about 120,000.[104] When family reunification started to decline, from the mid-1980s onwards, a new form of dependent immigration arose: a majority of young Turks brought spouses from Turkey to the Netherlands.[105] In the meantime, the population of Turkish origin was also growing by an already high birth rate. Thus, by January 2006, the total population of Turkish origin had grown to total 364,000, 46 per cent of which comprises the so-called second generation (i.e. those persons born in the Netherlands to one or two Turkish parents).

This figure represents, in a large majority, the original 'guest workers', their families and offspring, but it also includes some other categories of migrants from Turkey. As early as the 1970s, a few thousand Turkish Christians (Armenian and Syrian Orthodox) had received asylum in the Netherlands. The 1980 military coup in Turkey and the repression that followed it again caused a flow of asylum seekers to the Netherlands. So did the increasing tensions be-

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[103] Akgündüz 2007; Böcker 2000; Penninx et al. 1993.
[104] The regularisation of undocumented migrants in 1974-1975 has also contributed to the increase: 5,640 Turks were regularised and were thus counted as immigrated (Dagevos et al. 2006: 34)
[105] Hooghiemstra 2003.

tween Kurds and the Turkish national government in the 1990s. Although these remarkable immigration flows did have a significant influence on immigrant organisations, as we shall see later, the dominant picture of Turkish immigration is that of an originally intended temporary migration of low-skilled workers to industrial cities in the Netherlands. Most Turks (about 96 per cent) consider themselves Muslims, though there are differences among them. It is estimated that 15 to 35 per cent are Alevites. Most of the Turkish migrants in the Netherlands come from rural areas in central Anatolia and the coast of the Black Sea.

Settlement and community formation

The settlement process of Turkish immigrants can be viewed from two perspectives. On the one hand, there is the perspective of the group itself and its internal dynamics. On the other, there is that of Dutch society, its reaction to the newcomers and all the ensuing integration policies. Below we will briefly describe the various outcomes of these two forces and their interaction.

In a first phase, roughly until 1973, Turkish migrants lived a marginal life in Dutch society. Nearly all were male workers, living without their families, often on the premises of the factories where they worked or in cheap 'guest houses' in cities' poorest areas. They regarded their stay in the Netherlands as temporary, a view that was shared with the receiving society. The few facilities made available, such as a room to pray or a place to come together with compatriots, were provided either by their employers or by one of the Netherlands' Foundations for Assistance of Foreign Workers.[106]

The first oil crisis of 1973 and the ensuing recruitment stop introduced a second phase of settlement and community formation, from 1973-1985. Many Turkish workers decided to bring their families to the Netherlands. That changed their situation drastically: they had to find housing in residential areas, schools for their children and organise a life for the family in the country of settlement. In this period a social infrastructure in the Turkish community emerged: all kind of organisations, religious facilities such as mosques and Koran schools, Turkish coffeehouses, etc. In many ways, these efforts can be seen as re-creating in the new country the world that was left behind.

From 1985 on, a new dynamic influenced the newly built community. The Turkish group had been quite homogeneous – both in terms of the characteristics they inherited from their country of origin and their experiences in the country of settlement – but from 1985 on, a growing diversification became visible. This was due in the first place to the upcoming second generation: a part of them had successfully used the educational opportunities in the Netherlands and their social mobility brought significant changes. Another part of the youngsters, however, had not been as successful in education and tended to rely more on the Turkish community. Their choice of marriage part-

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[106] Stichtingen Bijstand Buitenlandse Wernemers.

ners – predominantly coming from their particular region of origin – stimulated new immigration.

This diversification manifested itself in several domains. In the economic domain we see not only a diversification in the wage labour market, mainly through a higher educated second generation, but also the robust growth of entrepreneurship among Turks. Many established themselves as small retailers in food and consumer goods, but some of these entrepreneurs also proved successful in innovative branches of trade and services.

Compared to other immigrant groups, Turks in the Netherlands have developed a relatively strong position in Dutch politics: they participate more in politics, have a greater sense of trust in local and governmental institutions and are more interested in local news and politics.[107] As voters, they have a tradition of voting for parties left-of-centre. However, as political entrepreneurs, elected MPs and local councillors of Turkish origin in the Netherlands, by now, they have covered the whole political spectrum. During the 2002 Dutch elections, 208 migrant politicians were elected into municipal councils, more than half them was of Turkish origin. In the national elections of 2006, 235,000 Turkish-Dutch were eligible to vote (i.e. individuals age eighteen or older who held Dutch citizenship): this population comprised 1.9 per cent of the country's total eligible voters. Four Turkish-Dutch candidates were elected to the 150-seat parliament (2.7 per cent). While ethnic voting among Turks has decreased over time, it remains high compared to other ethnic groups and the Dutch themselves.[108]

Dutch society, its opportunities and challenges

In the post-war period, the Netherlands considered itself a non-immigration country,[109] a perception that explains the absence of integration policies for these newcomers in the 1960s and 1970s.[110] For the guest workers, most notably those from Turkey, this meant that ad hoc measures – made in anticipation of their return – regulated their status in the Netherlands.

This policy, however, came under great pressure in the late 1970s, when it turned out that many (Turkish and Moroccan) guest workers were bringing their families on a large scale. The beginning of the 1980s then saw the design and implementation of explicit integration policies known as the Ethnic Minorities (EM) Policy.[111] In essence, this was a welfare-state policy intended to stimulate equality and equity of vulnerable groups in society. The basic rationale was that specific groups in Dutch society who had low socio-economic status and were perceived as being ethnically and/or culturally dif-

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[107] Fennema & Tillie 1999.

[108] Van Heelsum 2006; Michon & Tillie 2003.

[109] Ministerie 1970.

[110] Blok Commission 2004.

[111] For a detailed analysis see Bruquetas-Callego et al. 2007 and Ministerie 1981, 1983.

ferent from the Dutch mainstream would run the risk of becoming permanently marginal groups. Low-status immigrant groups thus became targets of this policy, as did some native Dutch groups such as the *woonwagenbewoners* ('caravan dwellers') and the long-established 'gypsies'. In order to prevent ethnic minority formation, socio-economic equality and cultural and religious equity were to be promoted: the emancipation of these immigrant groups was deemed important. Their participation, thus, in all spheres of society, including the political, was to be encouraged. An important assumption was that development of identity – both individual and at the group level – would have a positive influence on a group's integration into broader society.[112]

The 1980s have come to be seen as the heyday of EM policy. Irrespective of how any outcomes are evaluated, the policy's range of initiatives is impressive, especially when compared to other European countries in the same period. In the legal-political domain, for example, the Netherlands' full legislation was scrutinised for discriminatory elements on the basis of nationality, race and religion,[113] and many changes were made. Anti-discrimination legislation was reinforced, and a structure for discrimination-related reporting and consultation was established. What's more, in 1985, active and passive voting rights for alien residents in local elections were introduced. In 1986, Dutch nationality law was modified to include more elements of *ius soli*, thus making it much easier for alien immigrants and their children to become Dutch citizens. Over the course of time, a consultation structure for all target groups of EM policy was established to give them a voice in matters regarding their position in society.[114] Subsidising EM organisations, both at national and local levels, and trying to engage them in integration efforts became an important strategic aspect of policy implementation.

In the socio-economic domain, employment, education and housing were key. EM policy oversaw several initiatives that were taken to combat high unemployment rates, including a law inspired by the Canadian Employment Equity Act, and affirmative action by national and local governmental employers during the period 1986-1993. The effects of these measures, however, have proven weak. In the domain of education, measures focused predominantly on compensating arrears of immigrant children in the regular educational system. A small part of the efforts and resources, however, was also dedicated to specific measures, such as education in the native language and culture of immigrants.[115] In the domain of housing, 1981 saw a fundamental change introduced to allow legally residing aliens full access to social housing, which had

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[112] Blok Commission 2004.

[113] Beune & Hessels 1983.

[114] In 1985, a National Advisory and Consultation Body (LAO) was established to represent the most important minority organisations. The LAO was to advise the government on issues of immigrant integration and to be consulted in the context of administrative issues relating to integration policy. In 1997, the LAO was replaced by the National Consultation Body for Minorities (LOM), an institution with a weaker mandate.

[115] Lucassen & Köbben 1992.

been previously denied. Given the fact that social housing comprises the majority of all housing in big cities in the Netherlands, this measure had very positive consequences for the position of alien immigrants.

With regard to culture, language and religion, EM policy was *avant la lettre* in terms of 'multiculturalism'. The aim of fostering the migrants' culture – in keeping with the EM policy philosophy – was, theoretically, left to the groups and their organisations, and delimited by acknowledgement of general laws in the Netherlands. The role of the government was defined as that of facilitating, i.e. creating opportunities for minorities, such as special programmes in immigrant languages in the media. As for religion, 'new religions' could legally claim facilities, such as denominational schools and broadcasting resources, on the same conditions as established religions. The outcome was the relatively quick institutionalisation of Islam.[116]

Towards the end of the 1980s, public and political discourse began to look critically at EM policy. It had 'failed in important areas of labour and education',[117] with criticism falling on the collective character of the policy (vis-à-vis target groups and their emancipation) and its 'overemphasis on cultural aspects'.[118] This led to the formulation of various integration policies throughout the 1990s. The new policy document[119] thus put the emphasis on the individual, accentuated the socio-economic aspects of integration – rather than on the group and its cultural and religious aspects. It also stressed, more than ever before, individuals' own responsibilities as citizens in integration processes.[120] This led to new directions of policy implementation throughout the 1990s including, at one end of the spectrum, the nationally instituted courses given to newcomers as an introduction to Dutch society, and at the other end, more area-based urban policies.

The beginning of the twenty-first century was primed for a new shift in policy orientation. This was caused by a full-fledged politicisation and polarisation of the topics of immigration and integration. The new dominant view was that integration processes and policies had fundamentally failed, and moreover, that the social cohesion of Dutch society was endangered. The topics, framed in such a light, were successfully exploited in 2002's national election campaigns, thus reinforcing the politicisation. What followed was the so-called Integration Policy New Style, as formulated in a letter of the Minister for Aliens' Affairs and Integration.[121] A series of proposals and measures followed to reduce immigration (the Netherlands has had a negative net migration balance since 2003), and to introduce mandatory forms of integration for new-

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[116] Rath et al. 2001.

[117] Scientific Council (WRR) 1989.

[118] Ibid.

[119] 'Contourennota' Ministerie 1994.

[120] Scholten 2007.

[121] TK 2003-2004 29203, nr. 1.

comers and oldcomers alike. Observers have called these forms 'neo-assimilationist'.[122]

All in all, remarkable shifts and changes have taken place in policies during the now 45 years of settlement of Turks in the Netherlands. But how should we view the relevance of these policies and their changes for the settlement process? And how should we view them in comparison with the context experienced by the Germans and Poles of earlier periods? Two paradoxical key points are crucial, in our view.

On the one hand, state policies – originating from general welfare state policies that intend to include migrants on a level of equality – have created a historically unprecedented new structure of participation opportunities for newcomers in Dutch society. The legal status for legally residing aliens is unprecedentedly strong and such a status warrants access to more and more facilities of the welfare state. Acquisition of Dutch citizenship is much easier, the consequence of which means that over three quarters of the population of Turkish origin presently holds Dutch citizenship (over 200,000 having dual nationality).[123]

On the other hand, the political and policy discourse on certain immigrant groups such as Turks – as well as society's attitudes towards them – has become harsher during the last decade. Newcomers are reproached for not taking their chances, for so-called failed integration, for supposedly dubious loyalty to their new citizenship (i.e. by retaining their old citizenship) and for not conforming to basic principles that are presented as universal. It is their cultural and religious heritage – Islam – that is seen as hindering full integration and thereby endangering social cohesion in Dutch society. The paradox found its expression in the Integration Policy New Style of 2003-2007 that did not so much undo the opportunities created in the periods before (many domains of policy remained untouched), but focused on a few highly symbolic topics of national policy. This manifested in a reduction of new immigration, selection of immigrants on their intention and ability to integrate, introduction of a Dutch language test, measuring an applicant's knowledge of Dutch society as part of the admission procedure and imposing civic integration courses upon arrival in the Netherlands (successfully passing such courses became a prerequisite for renewal of temporary residence permits).

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[122] Entzinger 2006; for a good overview see Scholten 2007.
[123] Fermin et al. 2003.

4.2. Development of Turkish immigrant organisations

Turkish immigrant organisations developed in phases.[124] In the first phase, from 1960 to 1975, organisation rates were low. Turkish guest workers led a marginal life in Dutch society, mostly in anticipation of their return to Turkey. While a few transplanted political organisations had, by the end of the period, established themselves, some 'cultural centres' also came to exist in Dutch cities. Most were managed by welfare organisations like the Foundations for Assistance of Foreign Workers, and some were taken over by Turkish associations at the end of the first phase.

In a second phase, between 1975 and 1985, parallel to what we described earlier as the community-formation phase, organisations with a clear political orientation started to grow. Many were transplanted political organisations, being sister organisations of political groups that were active in Turkey though often forbidden. The HTIB, an organisation that was close to the forbidden Turkish Communist Party, was one of the earliest, followed by many others (see the first case study). In the second half of this period, when community formation was well underway, religious, often Islamic, associations became the dominant form of new organisations. At the same time, there was a boost in associations focusing on cultural, leisure and social aspects of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands.

On the one hand, from the beginning of the 1980s, the new EM policy presented a welcoming window of opportunities. The transplanted political and religious organisations enjoyed the liberty of organising themselves in the Netherlands, while those that focused on social and cultural integration were explicitly welcomed and supported. From 1985, the whole spectrum of these organisations was offered as a platform for representing the interests of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands in the form of the IOT, an advisory and consultative body to the Dutch government (see the fourth case study).

On the other hand, the boost of immigrant organisations in the Netherlands during the first half of the 1980s was also promoted by political developments in Turkey. Both political and religious currents were banned after the 1980 coup in Turkey, and refugees often brought a new impetus to organisations in the Netherlands. The active policies of the Diyanet, the state-controlled form of Islam in Turkey, added further to the blooming of competition between religious organisations in the Netherlands.

In the third phase, from 1985 on, we see increasing differentiation. On the one hand, the dominance of religious associations continued, though this field does seem to stabilise in recent years. Political organisations, particularly those transplanted from Turkey in the beginning, have lost relative importance.

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[124] Turkish organisations in the Netherlands and, for that matter, in Amsterdam have been relatively well researched: Avci-Boer 2007; Nell 2008; Tillie & Fennema 1997; Van Heelsum 2004; Van Heelsum & Tillie 1999; Vermeulen 2006.

Instead, a new form of ethno-political organisations arose, particularly among the Kurds. Increased tensions between the Turkish state and Kurds in Turkey since the early 1990s has not only given rise to an increased migration – through asylum or otherwise – it has also promoted the organisation of Kurds – political and otherwise – in the Netherlands.[125] Furthermore, social, cultural and educational organisations as well as those that focus on specific categories – such as women, youth, students, the elderly, entrepreneurs and their position in Dutch society – have contributed both to a diversification of the organisational field and to a stronger orientation towards Dutch society.

In 1998, Van Heelsum and Tillie conducted a comprehensive inventory of Turkish organisations in the Netherlands that existed.[126] They identified a total of 1,125 immigrant organisations, which testified to the fact that Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands showed a high degree of organisation.[127] An organisation's registration in the Chamber of Commerce, being Van Heelsum and Tillie's source of data, did not always permit precise identification, but a number of general trends could be observed.

In terms of ethnic subgroups from Turkey, 41 Kurdish, fourteen Armenian and nine Assyrian organisations were identified. Organisations identified as religious formed the largest category, numbering at about 170. Of these, 127 were related to the Diyanet, but other Islamic currents also counted significant numbers: the Süleymancilar (some 30), the Milli Görüş (37) and the Alevi current (34), each of which has its own umbrella organisation (see case study of the IOT). And in terms of references to Turkish political currents, some 40 leftist and 50 rightist organisations were identified.

As for other forms of categorisations, three labels prove most prominent. The first indexes cultural practices such as music, dance and theatre. The second indexes sports – football, in particular. The third indexes participatory organisations such as advisory and consultative councils. Another label indexes special categories among the Turkish community, which accounts for 105 youth organisations, 60 women's organisations and 23 organisations focused on elderly Turks.

An interesting aspect of Van Heelsum and Tillie's research is their analysis of relations between Turkish organisations made by tracing board members that hold two or more functions in different organisations. Van Heelsum and Tillie's major conclusion in this respect is that the Turkish community in the Netherlands is characterised by clusters of similar organisations with overlapping board members as well as clusters that are connected to each other through a number of 'big linkers'. To a certain extent, individuals – often leaders holding board positions in several organisations – play an important role in this respect. Specific kinds of organisations, such as the IOT and local

[125] Nell 2008.

[126] Van Heelsum & Tillie 1999; Van Heelsum 2004.

[127] Already in 1991, Doomernik showed how the density of religious organisations in the Netherlands was much higher than in the FGR (Doomernik 1991).

councils instituted by authorities, much as in Amsterdam, offer opportunities for building bridging between different clusters.

Several case studies on specific organisations and their clusters have analysed the internal dynamics of organisations over time.[128] What transpires from such studies is that a slow but steady shift of orientation takes place in such organisations. Although they often have started as organisations seeking to create or recreate a Turkish world in the country of settlement, they tend to take on activities dealing with their position in that society, all the more so when children are born and raised there. In the case studies that we present below, we will try to look specifically for the dynamics of change within four different kinds of Turkish organisations.

4.3. Four case studies of Turkish organisations[129]

4.3.1. The HTIB: a transplanted political organisation

The Hollanda Türkiyeli Isçiler Birliği (HTIB), or the Association of Turkish Workers in the Netherlands, was the first Turkish political organisation in the Netherlands, established in 1974. Its founders had Marxist orientations and were supporting the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) that was illegal in Turkey at that time. The organisation had a double mission: to involve Turkish workers in the Netherlands in the struggle for an independent and democratic Turkey and to organise Turkish workers in the Netherlands in the struggle for their own rights.

During the 1970s, the HTIB grew fast, becoming a strong and very active organisation. It established not only branches in a dozen Dutch cities within five year of its beginning, but it also worked closely together with sister organisations in Germany, Belgium and the UK. It was also an active member in two European-wide Turkish umbrella organisations that shared its ideals: the European Committee for Peace and Freedom (TBÖK) and the Federation of Turkish Workers Associations in Europe (ATTF). In the Netherlands, the HTIB established ties, and cooperated with, trade unions and worker organisations of other immigrant groups, such as the Moroccan KMAN. Although the HTIB was, until 1985, clearly a centrally led organisation in the communist tradition, it did receive wider support from Dutch society, including subsidies of the Ministry of CRM that was responsible for the welfare of guest workers. The HTIB also generated income from its own publishing house and bookstore, the sale of food at events and manifestations and member contributions. Between 1974 and 1986, the HTIB published *Gerçek* (meaning 'truth'), a sporadically appearing newsletter for its own members.

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[128] Sunier 1996; Canatan 2003; Van Heelsum 2004; Vermeulen 2006.

[129] The descriptions of the four cases are heavily based on Gamze Avci-Boer's manuscript (2007). Avci-Boer used both archival documents and interviews to reconstruct the development of these organisations over the whole period of their existence up until 2007.

The first period of the HTIB's existence, from 1974 to 1986, marked the first part of the organisation's double mission to influence political developments in Turkey and to promote immigrant rights in the Netherlands. As such, the period was a prominent one in terms of developing the priorities and activities that would come to dominate the HTIB agenda. During this phase, the HTIB called for the organisation of resistance committees and boycotts against the Second National Front and the government in Turkey (1977), demanded freedom for the Turkish Communist Party, called for the abolition of Turkish Penal Code Articles 141 and 142 (1977, 1980), which forbid organisations based on class, religion or ethnicity, and demanded that Turkey leave pro-West organisations such as NATO, CENTO and the EU (1977, 1980). Furthermore, in 1977, the HTIB argued that Turkey should sign a non-aggression pact with what it referred to as 'our neighbour' – the Soviet Union – and called for the lifting of bans on democratic organisations in Turkey.

Turkey's military coup of 12 September 1980 and its ban on all existing political parties had important consequences for the HTIB. First of all, a number of political refugees, particularly members of the Turkish Communist Party, came to the Netherlands and became active within the HTIB. In 1982, they established the Dutch Committee for the Defence of Human Rights and Democracy, with the aim of organising activities to create solidarity with Turkey. More generally, after the 1980 coup, the HTIB once again came to focus on the political situation in Turkey. For instance, it initiated a petition against the military regime in Turkey (1982) and proposed a campaign against the military's constitution (1982).   One of the HTIB's ongoing legacies is its battle against fascism, particularly when it comes to the Turkish National Movement Party (MHP), also referred to as the Grey Wolves. The MHP is a far-right nationalist political party that was founded in the 1960s. It was dubbed 'fascist' by many left-wing thinkers, because of its mythic-like Turkish nationalism that wanted to 'restore' Greater Turkey. During the 1970s, militias connected to the party were held responsible for the many murders of left-wing politicians, students and others. After the military coup of 1980, the MHP, like all other political parties, was banned though later resurfaced under a different name. Anti-fascist actions and statements of the HTIB were particularly strong in the organisation's early year. Many refer to Turkey, but from 1976 on, these actions were also aimed at the Grey Wolves – as they are (supposed to be) organised in the Netherlands. Along with other issues, the HTIB lobbied in Dutch political circles to close the MHP's Netherlands-based branches. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, leftist organisations and MHP-related groups participated in several violent incidents in the Netherlands, leaving some participants dead.[130]

Although the primary focus of activities was thus on Turkey, in its first period, the HTIB also engaged in activities related to the other part of its mission: organising Turkish workers in the Netherlands in the struggle for their rights. In statement and actual practice, *workers* and their issues were key. HTIB

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[130] Penninx 1980.

organised the workers' nights and the educational activities for their children. Education, particularly concerning that of Turkish workers' children, was a particular concern. Political and legal developments in the Netherlands, such as the Law on Employment of Foreigners and the Aliens Law, were closely followed and commented upon. In 1982, the HTIB decided to publish informational brochures on the Turkish second generation, housing problems, problems in education, active and passive voting rights, racism and discrimination.

The HTIB has often worked together with organisations – both in the Netherlands and beyond, native or immigrant – so long as it shares the same goals for worker solidarity. The HTIB expresses its solidarity with workers of other nationalities, such as Moroccans, voices its opposition to oppression in Afghanistan, and promotes and supports demonstrations for illegal workers and victims of amnesties (1979). These actions are indicative of HTIB's nature as an internationalist workers' organisation.

Analysing HTIB's history, we see that there was a major turning point in the organisation's orientation in 1986. At their tenth conference, in 1986, HTIB declared that Turkish migration to the Netherlands was irreversible: that 'the myth of return' to Turkey should be dropped. At this point, the HTIB officially started to prioritise it activities according to the welfare of Turks in the Netherlands. The HTIB also decided to join the Turkish umbrella organisation IOT, established in the very same year, with strong support of the Dutch government. In fact, the HTIB's erstwhile leader, Nihat Karaman, was actively involved in the IOT's formation. Interestingly, this explicit change in orientation coincided with an important political development in Turkish politics: the Turkish Communist Party decided to merge with the Turkish Workers Party.

As of 1986, the HTIB shifted its focus on the Netherlands and changed its organisational structure to become less centrally led (also due to having lost long-standing leader Nihat Karaman, who was murdered in 1988). However, the HTIB preserved its 'socialist character'. The problems encountered by Turkish immigrants remain high on the organisation's agenda, particularly when it comes to education and unemployment. In the words of current leader Mustafa Ayrancı, the HTIB today sees Turkey as using its citizens abroad for its own interests, namely to form a strong lobby abroad. Ayrancı has argued that close ties with Turkey are undesirable because they contradict the Netherlands' multicultural society. He has gone on to say that Turks are here – in the Netherlands – to stay and no longer have anything to do with Turkey.

Such changes in orientation, however, never take place overnight. In practice, some of the HTIB's former preoccupations, such as fascism and religion, have stayed touchy issues for the organisation. They have expressed themselves, for example, in the HTIB's 1995 resistance to welcome the Dutch Union of Turkish-Islamic organisations (HTIKB) to become a member of the IOT. The HTIB viewed the HTIKB as representing the Grey Wolves. Nevertheless, the HTIB's focus on the Netherlands has not meant a total absence of

activities relating to Turkey. For example, the HTIB Leiden, as one of the organisation's most active branches, included in its 2007 work plan not only information meetings about political developments in Turkey, but also an agenda for teaching traditional Turkish music instruments (such as the saz), computer skills, folk dances, theatre and other Turkish practices that would be highlighted in cultural evenings. The HTIB Leiden planned to celebrate Children's Day (a Turkish national holiday in honour of the establishment of the Turkish Republic), Aşure Day (a religious holiday celebrated in Turkey) and Youth Day (another national Turkish holiday in the Kemalist tradition).

In the end, however, the problems of Turkish migrant workers in the Netherlands remain the HTIB's prime concern. The HTIB Leiden's 2007 work plan thus included information evenings on migrants' rights, the law on return, problems of non-native children at school, residential problems and child abuse. In this line, the HTIB also participated in various consultation schemes together with other immigrant organisations.

All in all, since the mid-1980s the HTIB has seen interest representation as being its main function, thus supporting the integration of Turkish workers and anticipating political developments in Dutch society. Consequently, its website states that 'it is obvious that integration in society has to happen as soon as possible.' The HTIB is committed to the integration of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands and defines integration as 'to be able to participate independently in society'. The HTIB's most pressing concerns are employment, education and schooling. The path to achieve integration is through emancipation and participation.

4.3.2. The Milli Görüş: a religious organisation stemming from the Turkish context

Turkey's movement known as the Milli Görüş (whose name means 'national vision') is emblematic of the group's particular interpretation of Muslim history and Western influence. According to this doctrine, the Muslim world has experienced a moral and material decline for several centuries, though it was once far more advanced than the West. The main source of Milli Görüş supremacy is based on faith. The movement argues that the mimicking of the West has put Turkey on a backwards track. In order to regain its future, Turkey must consequently focus on principles balancing moral-spiritual and material development. In Turkey, the Milli Görüş movement has been closely linked to political parties such as the National Salvation Party (MSP) – until the 1980 military coup came to forbid its existence – the Welfare Party (RP), the Virtue Party (FP) and the Felicity Party (SP). These three parties may be viewed as consecutive revivals of the same party after each was banned by the state. More recently, the FP, which was closed down in 2001, split into two parties: the SP, representing traditionalists, and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is seen as the reformist wing of the movement. The AKP made great electoral victories in recent years and has been in government since 2002. In 2003, under the AKP government, the foreign ministry issued a memorandum

to Turkish embassies saying they should cooperate with the Milli Görüş abroad.

Although the Milli Görüş had established itself in Europe, particularly in the FRG, by the late 1970s, the movement had experienced a strong impetus following the 1980 coup. The MSP was forbidden in Turkey and prominent leaders fled to Europe to build a strong centrally led European Milli Görüş organisation known as the AMGT, which was based in the FRG. This AMGT organised itself in regional branches. Its scattered initiatives throughout the Netherlands united in 1981 to serve as a national regional branch. In 1988, the group was renamed the Netherlands Islamic Federation (NIF). In 1997, the group was split to cover two regions: the Milli Görüş South Netherlands and the Milli Görüş North Netherlands. The former's network was composed of eighteen mosque organisations and about 40 youth and women's associations by then. The latter had united about twenty local, mostly mosque associations.

The Milli Görüş in the Netherlands offers a broad range of services. These include Koran courses, religious education to children and youth, homework help, language courses, orientation courses, mosque services, weddings, funerals, Friday prayers, pilgrimages to Mecca, religious books, moral support and sports activities. They often have special youth and women's organisations, and have also established their own schools in a few Dutch cities. In their efforts, the Milli Görüş strives for more political participation and influence in decision-making. Their rhetoric focuses on education, dialogue and the permanent presence of Islam. Increasingly, they do this in the Dutch language and involve the Turkish second generation. Regardless of the activity, the group's rationale is that freedom of religion for Islam be granted at the national as well as the European level and that migrants have the right to live their own culture.[131]

A defining characteristic of the Milli Görüş Netherlands is its rivalry with the Diyanet. The groups compete for influence and recognition and over who is the more legitimate representation of the Turkish community in the Netherlands. This struggle plays itself out in various realms. One is the training of imams in the Netherlands. The Diyanet argues that the Dutch government cannot dictate anything about imam training, whereas leaders of the Milli Görüş North Netherlands proclaim that it is perfectly acceptable to train imams in the Netherlands (the group thus simultaneously demonstrating its 'pro-integrationist' attitude). Another controversy between the two groups manifests itself at the level of Islamic umbrella organisations. There are currently three such umbrellas, Diyanet being the most important member of the Islamic Council Netherlands (IRN) and the Milli Görüş being the most important member of the Dutch Muslim Council (NMR). Interestingly, both are participants in the National Council for Contacts with Government (CMO), which the Dutch government created in 2002 as a forum through which to consult Muslims on relevant issues.

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[131] See also Doomernik 1991, Landman 1992 and Sunier 1996.

Apart from competition with the Diyanet – clearly stemming from the Turkish context – the Milli Görüş shows solidarity with other Muslim communities. This expresses itself in actions such as collecting money for Muslims in Bosnia. Some actions even go beyond such distant support. Despite the Milli Görüş being often linked to anti-Semitism, in 2000, the group participated in talks aiming to bring the Jewish and Muslim communities closer to one another. The idea behind the talks was that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should not lead to violence against the Jewish community in the Netherlands. Representatives of the Jewish community and seven Muslim organisations, including the Milli Görüş, came together to distance themselves from any kind of violence against the Jewish community.

Up until the late 1990s, the Milli Görüş in the Netherlands did not deviate much from the traditional image of the Milli Görüş in greater Europe. However, the Milli Görüş North Netherlands had an exceptional period between the mid-1990s and 2006. At this point, the group began a much more progressive line, seeking an open dialogue with Dutch society. This was a marked contrast to traditional practices of the Milli Görüş elsewhere. Its leaders, Hacı Karacaer (who used to be also an active member of Amsterdam's Labour Party) and Üzeyir Kabaktepe, were both very visible in the Dutch media. They argued that it was the new generation of Milli Görüş members who renewed their organisation's leanings, inducing change in the Netherlands that was independent of Turkey. Facilities created for youth became more functional (dealing with sports, education and leisure), rather than dealing directly with religion. The Milli Görüş' primary mission had been to coordinate and ultimately spread Islam, but it simultaneously aimed to become part of the mainstream of the Dutch culture. Emancipation of women has thus been considered an important issue, though such emancipation may not have the same form as it would for native Dutch women. Twenty-four organisations are associated with the women's federation of the Milli Görüş North Nederland, with approximately 250 volunteers. There are about 5,000 women rank and file supporters. Most of them wear a veil, though the Milli Görüş declares it also is open to women without them.

The Aya Sofya project in Amsterdam is emblematic of the Milli Görüş North Netherlands' approach and the way they see their integration. By 1994, after negotiations with the municipality about a place to build a mosque had failed, the group bought an old garage and its terrain, which were situated in a highly multicultural district of Amsterdam with many Turkish inhabitants. The Milli Görüş began to undertake all kinds of provisional activities (i.e. without formal permission), including religious services, in the buildings. The idea was to build a brand-new mosque annex facility centre, including parking, residences, shops and a sports centre. That was the start of a long period of negotiation and struggle with the authorities on these activities and plans.[132] Although, in the strict sense, the battle was fought on procedural grounds (the

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[132] For a detailed analysis see Lindo 1999.

permission for use and for constructing non-residential buildings), the history of the protracted negotiations and procedures reveals a high symbolic sensitivity.

On the one hand, there were suspicions by Amsterdam authorities and politicians about the Milli Görüş' intentions (to build an 'Islamic fortress' or a 'Turkish stronghold' that would hinder integration). On the other hand, the Milli Görüş framed its comprehensive Islamic centre as something that fit very well into the pillarised tradition of Dutch society, in which individual worldview and integration into larger society go hand in hand. The Milli Görüş regularly mobilised their rank and file to demonstrate its genuine roots, at the same time stressing that they wished to integrate. They demonstrated openness by inviting Amsterdam's general public to the premises and to join in on activities for religious feasts and for dialogue. A new name, Westermoskee, came to replace that of Aya Sofia. This was a sign of integration, as was the physical design of the mosque – well adapted for the Amsterdam environment by a French architect – and the building plan that would include a significant number of residential houses.

Just as the long negotiations seemed to be leading to the actual construction of the new complex on the Milli Görüş-owned terrain – with the help of one of Amsterdam's largest housing corporations – the project came to a sudden halt in 2008. Under pressure from the organisation's headquarters in Germany, leadership of the Milli Görüş North Netherlands was replaced. This was reason enough for the housing corporation to stop the project. After leader Karacaer departed, there were signs that the Milli Görüş North Netherlands' 'progressive' policies were redressed and their more introverted, conservative tendencies were to be restored. The future of the group has become uncertain, but it seems improbable that those developments set in motion during the last decade can really be redressed.

4.3.3. The Diyanet: a set of directly exported religious organisations

The Diyanet is one of the largest Turkish organisations abroad. It is officially a branch of the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı). Its operation across various countries where Turkish migrants have settled differs according to individual countries' legal contexts. The Diyanet abroad, known as the DITIB, was founded in reaction to the formation of 'extremist Islamist' organisations among Turks in Europe and reflects the more 'secular' official Islam of the Turkish state. Their activities are geared towards preserving the cultural and religious identity of Turks abroad.[133]

The Diyanet in Europe cannot be understood without its Turkish Republican history. When Turkey made the choice for secularism as one of its founding principles, it decided that religion should be 'checked' and 'controlled' by the state. Established in 1924, the Diyanet was the institution to

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[133] Gamze Avci-Boer 2007; Den Exter 1990; Landman 1992.

implement this function. Although there have been organisational changes in the course of time, the group's statutory tasks have remained the same: to implement activities relating to Islamic belief, its cult and moral principles, to inform society in the domain of religion and to administer places of worship. Since 1970, all 'servants of the faith' are government employees. As a Sunni branch of Islam, Diyanet is supposed to represent Turkish Muslims. It does not cover Alevites. An important instrument of the Diyanet is its monopoly on the training of imams.

To offset political influence by the Diyanet, Turkey's 1982 constitution stipulated that the directorate be directly responsible to the prime minister and have no direct contact with daily politics. In practice, political leaders with their methods of bringing in Islam and the defenders of the secular republic have been a regular source of controversy in Turkish politics. This has been reflected in the Diyanet and its position. The most famous example of a pro-Islamic political leader is seen in Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey's leader of political Islam for over 30 years.[134] Meanwhile, the Turkish army and the constitutional court are the best examples of the defenders. To give an example for the period relevant to this analysis, after the 1980 coup, Turkish generals decided to combat 'foreign' ideologies such as socialism, communism and *Islamic fundamentalism*.[135] In order to combat such fundamentalism, they formulated a very peculiar antidote to safeguard the secular nature of the state. In the vision of a 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis', as the policy was called, Islam was not only compatible with Turkish nationalism, but was an integral part of it. As a consequence, religious education was enshrined in the constitution that the military adopted in 1982, and the state was put in charge of religious education. Instruction in religious culture and moral education became compulsory in both primary and secondary education. The Diyanet was given a constitutional position. Its personnel grew from slightly over 50,000 in 1979 to nearly 85,000 in 1989. The number of mosques in Turkey grew from 47,645 in 1981 to 76,445 in 2003.

It was only in the early 1980s that the Diyanet emerged as an actor in Europe. The main rationale for its emergence was to contain the new Islamic movements that Turkish migrants had established in Europe and that subsequently impacted politics in Turkey. The Diyanet's foreign affairs unit was founded on the basis of Decree No. 3860 on 13 August 1984. Shortly after, religious counsellors (members of embassies) and religious affairs attaches

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[134] Erbakan founded his first Islamist National Order Party in 1970, though it was to be banned as anti-secular in 1971. He established the National Salvation Party (MSP) in 1972, won 11.8 per cent of the national vote and entered parliament. In 1974-1977, he served in three coalition governments as Deputy Prime Minister. The military banned all political parties in 1980, but Erbakan's followers founded the Welfare Party (RP) in 1983, over which Erbakan again presided as soon as the ban on former party leaders was lifted in 1987. In 1998, the Turkish Constitutional Court dissolved the Welfare Party for violating the secular nature of the republic. The Virtue Party (FP) replaced the Welfare Party almost overnight, but the constitutional court dissolved this party in 2001 as well.

[135] Zürcher 2004; emphasis added.

(members of consulates) were instituted as part of this foreign affairs unit. In the period that followed, the growth of the Diyanet in Turkey paralleled the growth of the Diyanet abroad. In 2003, Germany had the highest share of Diyanet members, with 639 employees; the Netherlands followed with 110 employees.

Table 3: Number of Diyanet employees abroad 1980-2003

Year	Number of personnel	Year	Number of personnel
1980	20	1992	833
1981	115	1993	846
1982	179	1994	937
1983	270	1995	991
1984	279	1996	968
1985	315	1997	942
1986	430	1998	1,029
1987	479	1999	1,060
1988	576	2000	1,105
1989	628	2001	1,132
1990	797	2002	1,183
1991	841	2003	1,186

Source: DIB APK Statistics in TESEV: 92

In 1985, the Diyanet's European headquarters, known as the DITIB, was founded in Cologne. Today, the organisation is largely funded by the Turkish state, though it also receives member contributions. As of August 2004, the DITIB Europe had 863 member associations. The DITIB duplicates its Turkey-based functions in Europe, meaning it is active in building, maintaining and operating mosques and it employs imams. The DITIB Europe's priorities entail religiously motivated activities (pilgrimage, religious feasts, burial funds, religious education), socio-cultural activities (conferences, inter-faith dialogues, exhibitions, soccer matches, national and religious celebrations, maintaining a student dorm), offering courses (in literacy, computers, hobbies, language and professional education and wrestling) and maintaining libraries. One of its bigger tasks is assisting the pilgrimages of Turkish migrants from the Netherlands. In 2004, 30 religious guides accompanied 1,015 Turkish-Dutch pilgrims.

In the Netherlands, the Diyanet is by far the largest Turkish organisation and has two branches: the Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation (TCIF) and the Islamic Foundation Netherlands (ISN). The TCIF was established in 1979, joining seventeen mosque organisations in existence at that time, and the ISN was established in 1982. The two group work closely together, though have a division of tasks. While the TCIF focuses on socio-cultural affairs along with problems experienced by Turkish migrants, the ISN deals with religious mat-

ters, including ownership of mosques, financial affairs, employment and education of imams, and the organisation of pilgrimages to Mecca.

The number of Diyanet imams in the Netherlands has risen over the years. Diyanet is presently in charge of 143 mosques (compared to some 25 Milli Görüş mosques) and 95 imams. The imams are Turkish civil servants, fully trained in Turkey and usually dispatched for four years to the Netherlands. Discussions on the role imams have taken place in the Netherlands since the 1980s. A key question is whether 'imported' imams can fulfil their function properly and thus whether imams who work in Dutch mosques should be educated in the Netherlands. The Diyanet defends its choice by stating that it chooses imams on the basis of their theological knowledge, representativeness and view on society. Their imams follow a special three-month training in the language, history, culture and traditions of the country where they will serve for the following four years. The Diyanet pays the imams' salary, though says it does not exert control over them in any way other than by setting the 'boundaries' for their mosques. The Diyanet expects the imams to remain politically neutral, as religion is seen as belonging to the private sphere of an individual.

Since 1999, two developments have catalysed change within the Diyanet. The first came directly from Turkey. Since the AKP came into power, two key appointments – Ali
Bardakoğlu as the Diyanet's president and Mehmet Aydin as the organisation's responsible minister – prompted a new course of action, one that is generally considered progressive. This manifested itself in 2004, when the Diyanet organised a convention called 'Religious services and religious education by Diyanet during the process of European integration'. Among its conclusions was that it is no longer sufficient for the Diyanet to only bring religious services to Turkish Muslims in Europe; other important topics, such as democracy, should be integrated into the group's work.

The second development was the changed global environment, most prominently represented by the focus on Islamism after the 9/11 attacks as well as Turkey's EU candidacy. Responding to these changes, the Diyanet appeared more comfortable than before to discuss politically relevant topics in public. It distanced itself from violence in the name of Islam, but also from reproaches that the Diyanet's activities would hinder integration. Bardakoğlu formulated Diyanet's task as follows:

> We can also see societal responsibilities and societal participation, contributions to society which we alternatively also can call integration. This in the end makes clear that is a religious requirement to be an active, productive and responsible member of the society one lives in.

Bardakoglu also pointed out that to fulfil this requirement, individuals should enjoy equal conditions and, to attain equal opportunities, a society's local language should be learned.[136]

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[136] Press conference in Cologne on 10 April 2007.

The Diyanet Europe acknowledges the permanence of Turkish migrants abroad, and has recently adjusted the training of its imams to include language training. There are also signs that, for religion classes, it may eventually accept the language of the country of settlement over Turkish. However, it is too early to tell whether the Diyanet has truly entered a new period. It is even more difficult to predict whether an adapted policy would enable the Diyanet to – as it has done in the past 25 years – continue mobilising support from residents of Turkish origin in countries such as the Netherlands, particularly among the second and third generations.

4.3.4. *The IOT: an umbrella organisation created by the country of settlement*

The Consultation Council for Turks (IOT) was established upon initiative of the Dutch government. It is part and parcel of the Dutch government's national consultation structure, being part of the Ethnic Minorities (EM) Policy introduced in the early 1980s. EM policy resulted in the passing of a special Law on Consultation of Minorities (WOM) and, in 1985, the establishment of a National Structure of Advice and Consultation of Dutch Minority Policy (LAO). In this LAO structure, seven separate advisory units are meant to represent the target groups of EM policy: Turks, Moluccans, caravan dwellers, Surinamese, Antilleans, refugees, and Moroccans and Tunisians (the Chinese were added later). The IOT joined this LAO structure on 13 January1986. The LAO meets with the minister responsible for integration at least twice a year. Each of the units may give solicited and unsolicited advice to the minister. The LAO and the individual offices of the units are financed by the government. In 1997, the LAO was replaced by the National Consultation Structure for Minorities (LOM), a comparable structure with a weaker mandate to have only consultative tasks vis-à-vis the government.

At present, the IOT serves as an umbrella organisation for nine Turkish organisations in the Netherlands. Initial members in 1985 were the Association of Turkish workers in the Netherlands (HTIB), the Diyanet-related Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation (TICF), the Islamic Center Foundation Netherlands (SICN), which represented Islam's Süleymancı stream, and the Federation of Turkish Sport and Cultural Associations (HTSKF). Others eventually joined, including the Milli Görüş-related Netherlands Islamic Foundation (NIF), the Federation of Democratic Social Associations (DSDF), the Association of Turkish Women in the Netherlands (HTKB), the Union of Turkish Islamic Associations in the Netherlands (HTIKB) and the Federation of Alevi and Bektashi Socio-cultural Associations in the Netherlands (HAK-DER).

The IOT's role is to represent the interests of the Turkish community in the Netherlands, serving as a platform for people to voice their concerns, as well as to advise the government. The IOT's topics of concern are reflected in its six special task groups: social security, labour market, education, culture, youth and women. Over time, the IOT has published a long list of advisory reports to the government on these key topics as well as on other topics of

increasing prominence that come from various sources: the Turkish community itself, the Dutch government in the form of solicited advisory reports and general debates in Dutch society. Apart from the key themes of social security, work and education, topics are wide-ranging, including legal-status problems, marriage migration, military service, honour-related crimes and care for the elderly.

In assessing the IOT's role in the integration process of Turks in the Netherlands and its orientation – towards Turkey versus the Netherlands – we will look in some more detail at two special topics. The first is the evolution of its membership over the course of time. The second is its handling of relations with Turkey and Turkish authorities.

IOT membership has been a contested topic, especially among organisations considered religious or politically right-wing or fascist. As we have seen, the total picture of Turkish organisations in the Netherlands during the mid-1980s represented all major political and religious divisions that were imported from Turkey. From the beginning, the Dutch government made great efforts to include all major umbrella organisations of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands as members of the IOT, including religious ones.[137] The government's efforts were relatively successful. The initial members of the IOT represented political and religious currents that would otherwise not cooperate: the HTIB with its legacy of relations with the Turkish Communist Party, two major religious umbrella groups with completely different backgrounds (one closely related to the Diyanet and the other to the Süleymancilar, a European-grown oppositional movement) and an umbrella group for sports and cultural organisations.

In the years after its establishment, the IOT has become an interesting platform for other umbrella organisations representing different political and religious currents. A case in point, in 1990, the Hacı Bektaş Vakfı applied for membership. On 27 October 1991, the HTIKB applied but was rejected. In 1994, there were membership requests by the HAK-DER, the HTIKB – both of which were accepted – and the HTIG-DER. The HTIKB's accession caused a big controversy within the IOT. Though it eventually returned, the HTIB initially withdrew its membership, claiming that the IOT was becoming dominated by Islamic organisations. Internal tensions between the HTIB and the HTIKB, however, continued to such an extent that, in 1995, a vote was taken on removing the HTIKB. The vote was rejected. In 1997, there were tensions between the NIF (which eventually joined in 1988) and the DSDF and the HAK-DER. Though the HAK-DER withdrew, it eventually returned later.

One can interpret these developments in several ways. It obviously takes quite some time and effort to unite organisations that have begun as opponents within a frame that stemmed from the country of origin. Moreover, the IOT has been able to bridge such cleavages to a great extent by working

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[137] Rath et al. 2001: 92.

from a new common frame of reference: that of the position of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands.

The IOT's relations with Turkey and its government has been an issue all along. Contacts with, and visits to, Turkey took place all the time and continue to this day. Their purpose usually relates to practical matters regarding Turkish migrant life. For example, contact with Turkey is made when the IOT is preparing advisory reports on dual nationality, paying off military service, visa issues, active and passive voting rights, education, relations between consulates and Turkish public, definite return to Turkey and retirement. The IOT also receives visits from Turkish politicians, such as a research delegation of the Turkish parliamentary assembly on problems of Turkish workers. And, vice versa, IOT delegations visit for the minister responsible for Turks abroad.

The IOT has developed a strategy to maintain some distance from Turkish politics. The topic has been discussed several times and a clear position has been reached among the members. In 1994, the executive board thus decided that 'relations with the Turkish Embassy should be considered as inter-institutional relations. Turkish officials should stop perceiving us as a lobby of theirs'. Another part of the statement refers indirectly to an important mechanism behind this distance: 'When the Embassy needs an opinion it should consider all federations (i.e. IOT members) as equals and should as much as possible contact the federations directly.' Participation of oppositional groups in the IOT is – at least from the perspective of the Turkish government – one of the best guarantees that the IOT will continue fencing off the influence of the Turkish government. Nevertheless, this does not prevent the IOT from taking a stance when it comes to certain political question and there is obviously agreement among all IOT parties. One such question has been the IOT's support of Turkey's efforts to join the European Union.

In sum, the IOT is clearly an organisation that has grown from the opportunity structure in the country of settlement. It acts as advisor and consultant to the Dutch government and is, to a great extent, financed by that government. Over time, it has positioned on its board the nearly complete spectrum of Turkish political and religious ideologies. It has replaced the dividing Turkish frame of origin by a common frame that represents the interest of Turkish immigrants and their descendants in the Netherlands. In doing so, the IOT has contributed to changing the orientations of its members from Turkey to the position of Turks in the Netherlands. This has been accomplished by using functional contacts with the Turkish government, but at the same time keeping a political distance, something which has been abetted by the organisation's diverse membership.

5. Conclusions and discussion

In this historical comparison, we looked at the immigrant organisations of Germans (1880-1920), Poles (1900-1940) and Turks (1960-present) in the Netherlands. Our questions were: 1) To what extent did nationality as a dominant principle, religiously mediated or not, influence the orientation of migrant associations with respect to integration into the receiving society? 2) To what extent did this influence change through time; and 3) Do results from comparing these three cases indicate the increased influence of a sending state on 'its' migrants and thus suggest that diasporic membership has become stronger in the course of time?

What can we conclude after reviewing the material presented so far? The first two questions can be answered by scrutinising the descriptive material within each of the cases. Essentially, we have tried to find such answers by analysing the development of immigrant organisations within each group and the shifts in numbers of organisations that are primarily oriented towards the country of origin versus those oriented towards the country of destination. We have also looked more closely at select organisations initiated by different actors – from countries of origin and destination. Our aim was to reconstruct their development and dominant orientations through time and offer insight into the 'why' and 'how' of such changes. The third question can only be answered on the basis of answers to the first two questions by comparing the temporally consecutive cases of Germans, Poles and Turks in the Netherlands.

German immigrant organisations and their orientation over time

As for Germans in the Netherlands, at first glance, we observe the strong feeling of national belonging. This is reflected in the relatively high number of organisations that present themselves as German. A closer look at the kind of organisations and their popularity among migrants, however, shows a much more differentiated picture.

Firstly, there were indeed German organisations that had been directly initiated, or strongly promoted, by agencies of the German state, with an explicit policy of promoting 'Germanness' among emigrants. The *Flottenvereine* are the clearest example, though they were not very popular among German immigrants in the Netherlands, who generally preferred to keep a low profile in the political sphere. The *Flottenvereine*'s rank and file was limited, and they did not last long. The support from the German state for German schools is a better example of a longstanding attempt to influence immigrants in the Netherlands. The idea of a German education was popular among German migrants in the Netherlands because it fitted very well with their predominant intention to stay temporarily and to ultimately return to Germany. In that sense, such practical considerations seemed to have been more important than any nation-

alist intentions, which immigrants were anyway disinclined to display too openly. Moreover, such schools were, to a certain, extent embedded in, and negotiated with, the Dutch educational authorities.

Secondly, a prominent place in the associational arena must be assigned to the *Hülfsvereine*: self-help associations for German migrants that often evolved from cultural or sport associations. These typically originated among migrants within a country of destination (sometimes with the help of more wealthy resident compatriots) in an era when many presently available welfare-state facilities did not exist and, if they existed, were not available for migrant aliens. The German organisations were based more on social solidarity and a common (outsider) position in Dutch society than on ethnic belonging. They aimed at improving the situation in the country of destination (or upon repatriation, if no other opportunities were available).

Thirdly, culture and leisure organisations enjoyed great popularity, particularly in arts and sports that were associated with being typically German. It seems, however, that most of these associations did not limit membership exclusively to Germans. In this sense, they were not nationalistic. Many actually became part of the larger Dutch civil society, thereby eventually becoming integrated by being accepted by – rather than by adapting to – that society.

The general conclusion on the basis of the material seems to be that – if we speak of nationalism among immigrants as expressed through their organisations – Germans immigrants in the Netherlands experienced a 'cultural', rather than a political, nationalism. Attempts to influence national feelings by governmental agencies of the country of origin were welcomed as far as they fitted such cultural needs, in combination with practical considerations of possible return (as seemed to be the case with German schools). Attempts to promote explicit political nationalism, such as in the case of the *Flottenvereine*, were – differently from what one would expect in the period covered – relatively unsuccessful and short-lived. It is difficult to assess in how far the dominant 'cultural nationalism' may have slowed down integration into Dutch society, but it did obviously not hinder the participation of Germans in the Netherlands. One could even argue that the many organisations that primarily aimed at such participation. Groups, such as the *Hülfsvereine*, were an indispensable means for structural integration in the first phase of settlement of many migrants.

Finally, what about the role of religion in the German case? Yes, it clear that influence from the country of origin was mediated to a certain extent by religion. On the positive side, one aspect of this is that Lutheranism, the dominant religion in Northern Germany, could continue and, to a certain extent, expand extant activities with some support of the German state. But the negative side may be even more important, namely, the near absence of Catholics in the arena of German immigrant organisations. Catholic Germans – unlike Catholic Poles – opted for joining Dutch Catholic organisations rather than establishing their own or participating in Lutheran ones. This resulted not only from the competition between the two religions in Germany but, more impor-

tantly, from the negative attitudes of the German government towards Catholics in the period concerned. From the perspective of Catholic German immigrants, the mirrored situation in the Netherlands was that Lutheranism was historically associated with being an immigrant religion, while Catholicism was completing its 'emancipation' within the Dutch pillarised political system in exactly that period.

Polish immigrant organisations and their orientation over time

While German immigration to the Netherlands in the period 1880-1940 had a long tradition, this was not the case for the immigration of Poles in what was the new mine industry in Limburg (at least if we leave aside the considerable influx of Jews from Polish areas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). Many of the early immigrants had gone through a trajectory of migration to Germany, but were new to the Netherlands. The Polish immigrant community that was built up was characterised by a relative high homogeneity: Polish in their ethno-national orientation, Catholic in their worldview, working in the coalmines and living in designated neighbourhoods close to the mines.[138] Poles, furthermore, lived and worked in an environment in the Netherlands that shared Catholic traditionalism.

After Poland's 1918 establishment, the state not only started an active emigration policy, but it also created an accompanying policy for maintaining the Polishness of emigrants while abroad. In the Netherlands (or more precisely, in the province of Limburg where they lived and worked) this implied a number of activities that were initiated and/or supported by Polish governmental agencies. The activities included providing assistance to Polish citizens in general, the coordination of organisations of Poles in the Netherlands and information and schooling. Much more so than in the German case, it seems that the Polish authorities were successful in organising and stimulating not only cultural nationalism, as expressed in cultural organisations, language training and so on, but also in forms of political patriotism. Such 'success' could be attained because it matched the patriotic feelings most of the concerned emigrants had.

The role of the Catholic authorities was ambiguous in these developments. A first reason may be that Polish state authorities and nationalist forces did not regard Catholicism as an unconditional part of Polish ethno-national identity in the period 1920-1940. Still, those representing Polish Catholicism in the Netherlands were hesitant to organise 'their' Catholics in a context in which Polish political representatives would dominate. Furthermore, the local Catholic organisation in the province or country of settlement was hesitant to stress the Polishness alongside the Catholic identity. This meant that the preference of most migrants – an uncomplicated fusion of the two identities that

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[138] This was the reason that elsewhere in the Netherlands there was almost no contact with other immigrants from Poland, such as Jews, who were mostly centred in cities in the urbanised western provinces.

were important for them, Catholicism and 'Polishness' – was not always easy to attain.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the initially strong national orientation of Polish mine workers in the Netherlands in the period 1920-1940 did not last over generations. Research among the Polish miners and their descendants in Limburg at the end of the 1970s shows a well-integrated population that still had a number of 'Polish' organisations of a folkloristic kind. Full 'assimilation' as measured in the late 1970s, however, is partly explained by a heavy selection among the Poles in the late 1930s: dismissals by the (state-owned) mines and forceful repatriation of those Polish workers who lacked strong ties (e.g. Dutch spouses) with the Netherlands. [139]

Turkish immigrant organisations and their orientation over time

The settlement process of the Turks – unlike that of the Germans and Poles – is as yet an un unfinished story. Although this migration movement started over 40 years ago and the Turkish community includes a substantial second generation by now, there is also a significant diversification. The diversification is fed by a continuous new immigration of spouses, family members and, to some extent, refugees, as well as by a growing diversification of in societal position: some of the children born and raised in the Netherlands have been successful in attaining a better position than their parents. These tendencies are reflected in Turkish organisations. Religious associations remain the dominant form of organisation, representing both a marker of identity in relation to the society of settlement and a mirror of opposition to the dominant form of Islam supported by the Turkish state. Transplanted political organisations, particularly those oppositional ones from the Turkish perspective, still exist. But within both forms of organisations an increased orientation towards the receiving society is noticeable. It tries to combine religion and worldview, with a growing focus on the position of members in the society of settlement. Such a combination, often presented as a form of integration on the basis of accepting cultural and religious difference, may be contested by parts of the society of settlement. Nevertheless, the empirical material clearly indicates that such shifts take place, even if they are not linear in certain cases. Still, we see a plethora of organisations in the field of leisure, sports and culture that are clearly inspired or encouraged by the environment in the country of settlement. A great deal of them organise specific categories of individuals, such as youngsters, women and the elderly, which testifies to their focus on the society of settlement, even if the organisations may do this from a conception of integration that presupposes acceptance of cultural and religious difference.

The context in which these processes of change have taken place for Turks is different from that for the Germans and Poles. Turkish migration began as a temporary one. From beginning of the 1980s, however, an institu-

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[139] Brassé & Van Schelven 1980.

tional context developed to open up significant opportunities for participation. They were to be found on the individual level (e.g. in the form of political participation) and on the collective level of organisations. This was followed by a period in which a strong politicisation of the political discourse on immigrants and their integration emerged in Dutch society. The discourse and policy changes that went with it did not so much reverse these opportunities, but significantly changed the terms of what integration should entail.

In sum, compared with the Germans and the Poles before them, Turks have had unprecedented opportunities both for integration-oriented organisations and for organisations that were transplanted or otherwise originated – as oppositional movements – from the country of origin. This is testified by the proliferation of political, religious and ethnic (Kurdish) organisations that were allowed to function within the liberal-democratic rules of Dutch society. At the same time, a strong negative element has developed over the last fifteen years in the Dutch discourse on integration. Targeted in this discourse are immigrants seen as unwilling to exploit their opportunities for integration, whose loyalty to the new country is suspect (e.g. in the form of dual nationality) and, furthermore, whose religious (i.e. Muslim) convictions and practices are seen as hindrances to their integration, if not as forms of endangerment to the social cohesion of Dutch society. These same doubts are projected on their organisations.

If we focus on the role of the Turkish state and, more generally, of the country of origin, it is clear that the major initial impetus for organisational forms has come from country of origin. This transpires not only in the transplanted political organisations that represent the total spectrum of politics in Turkey – from the extreme left to the extreme right – but also in the wide range of Muslim organisations forming an impressive array of oppositional Islamic currents long forbidden in Turkey. On top of this, there are the clusters of ethnic organisations that have sprung from the refugee communities of Kurdish, Syrian Orthodox and Armenian immigrants from Turkey. Emanating from the problematic context in the country of origin, the position of such organisations may change significantly in the course of time, depending on what happens in the country of origin. What seems different here from the German and Polish cases is that 'governmental Turkish agencies' have played a different role. By banning political, religious and ethnic organisations at home they have indirectly contributed to the rise of a plethora of 'oppositional organisations' among the migrants abroad. These oppositional organisations are, by definition, almost always oriented towards the country of origin because that is where changes should take place, as is illustrated by Kurdish organisations in Western Europe.

At the same time, one sees that 'imported' orientations change within organisations over time, as a consequence of their existence in the country of settlement. In most cases, such orientations are complemented by increased orientation towards the position of immigrants in that receiving society. The HTIB and the Milli Görüş cases show this, yet they simultaneously illustrate

that this is not necessarily a smooth or linear process. The Diyanet case documents how their organisations have adapted themselves by defending and promoting what they see as an integrated form of religion in Dutch society. The IOT is, in this sense, completely different, having been initiated by authorities in the country of settlement. Its *raison d'être* has first and foremost been to bridge internal cleavages within the Turkish community in the Netherlands that otherwise would be insurmountable. The IOT did not abandon its orientation towards the country of origin, but gave highest priority to those common interests in the country of settlement.

Evaluating the present situation, we conclude that Turkish political and Muslim organisations still have an important place in the spectrum of organisations. They have, however, lost their initial monopoly, to give way to a much more diverse spectrum of Turkish organisations of interest groups (within the Dutch context), of categories (youngsters, women, elderly, students) and in different domains (culture, language, education, leisure, cultural heritage).

An increased influence of sending states?

This leaves us with the overarching comparative question: Has the power of the sending state in controlling 'its' emigrants abroad increased over time, thus tying them much more firmly to the sending community and encouraging a sense of diasporic membership? Let us state explicitly that neither our material – different in kind and quality as it is for the three different periods and cases – nor the number of cases allows for testing in any strict sense. Nevertheless, we have found some convincing indications for which direction our answer might go.

Firstly, the ways through which sending states have tried to influence immigrant associations and organisations do not differ essentially in the three cases. The main instruments are representation of interests of their citizens, selective support of certain organisations, activities in the domains of language and schooling and support of immigrant identity markers such as religion. In this respect, there seems to be more continuity than change over time.

Secondly, the effectiveness of such efforts of sending states depends essentially on the attitudes and orientations of migrants themselves and their perceptions and choices. In initial stages of migration – when the duration of stay is limited and the perception of temporariness and intended return still dominant – migrants may be relatively easy mobilised. Or, they mobilise themselves for cultural matters and, in some cases, also for political matters related to the country of origin. But as ties with, and interests in, the society of settlement increase along duration of stay, as families become firmly settled and children grow up in the society of settlement, such choices inevitably shift. This does not necessarily mean that orientation towards the country of origin (or that of one's parents) disappears. Such an orientation may co-exist with a sharpening focus on the society of settlement for quite some time. The ultimate outcome is not linear or necessarily predictable, generally taking on an-

other priority and/or a different meaning. In any case, the power of sending countries to control 'its' citizens, in this respect, decreases as the options of individual migrants increase. The post-war Turkish migrants in the Netherlands gained a much stronger legal-political position (a majority are formal Dutch citizens) within a relatively short time than the German and Polish immigrants earlier on. In this sense, the power of sending states to control has clearly decreased. In addition, it seems that receiving societies like the Netherlands are nowadays more alert to, and critical of, efforts of sending countries to influence 'their' emigrants. This may well be for the wrong reasons – the assumption that sending states can really hinder the integration process in the country of settlement – but it is still a fact. These two observations certainly do not indicate that the power of sending states to control its citizens has increased in the course of time. The contrary is more likely.

Thirdly, the Turkish case has shown that the migratory situation offers ample opportunities to act against state power of the sending country rather than the other way around. Liberal-democratic regimes in countries of settlement allow organisations and activities that may be suppressed in the country of origin. Religious, political and ethnic movements not allowed in Turkey have flourished in Europe, as we have seen. From a narrow 'integrationist' point of view of parts of the country of settlement, these phenomena may be seen as similar to movements that cooperate with governments in power. From such a perspective, both variants 'testify' to loyalties and orientations outside the country of settlement. But from the perspectives of the migrants and the governments of sending countries, they have quite a different meaning and consequences for action. The different origins of organisations often lead to different trajectories of development, which is of utmost relevance for the study of such movements. Organisations that are directly related to state agencies in the country of origin are best studied in a bi-national frame (country of origin and country of settlement), while oppositional organisations and movements among migrants tend to develop stronger transnational or diasporic ties across immigrant communities in various countries of settlement.

Fourthly, the Turkish case shows spectacular forms of mobilisation among emigrants. This was shown in events such as the earthquake in Turkey (2003) and political events such as the Turkish government's permission of public veil-wearing (2005) and the revival of Turkish-Kurdish tensions. New facilities of communication undeniably contribute to such mobilisations. We should realise, however, that this is a general feature of all mobilisation movements nowadays, but that does not testify necessarily to the sustainability (i.e. long duration) of such mobilisations. What is different then is that reactions to developments in the countries of origin may have much stronger visibility and more immediate consequences than in the past.

Finally, our material indicates that the role of religion in the state politics of sending countries and in integration processes of migrants needs a thorough rethinking. In a recent article, Foner and Alba (2008) addressed: 'Why immigrant religion is viewed as a problematic area in Western Europe in con-

trast to the United States, where it is seen as facilitating the adaptation process'? As indicated by the research question, the article focuses primarily on the perception of religion and its function in integration processes, both by scholars and societies in general, while implicitly making a strong argument to give a more prominent place to religion and worldview in studying processes of integration. Our findings underscore this suggestion.

We make two observations on the role of religion vis-à-vis the question of influence of countries of origin on its citizens abroad. The first relates to the following question: To what extent is religion defined as part of the national imagination of the sending country, and thus part of the instruments used by the countries of origin to influence its citizens? In all three cases, such a definition has had significant selective effects on emigrants, their organisation and their susceptibility to influences from sending countries. The second observation is an empirical one: the material indicates that – from the perspective of migrants – religion or worldview is generally a more persistent orientation in integration processes than national identity. Whether the religious orientations of immigrants can easily be embedded in existing organisations in the country of settlement, or not, then becomes then a crucial question.

In conclusion – and returning to the examples of the introduction – we may state that recent symbolic attempts by Turkish and Moroccan politicians to bind 'their' citizens in Western Europe is not new at all. Rather, it is a continuous characteristic of the nation-state that developed from the early nineteenth century onwards. Although the role and subsequent power of the state has changed quite considerably in the last century (the emergence of the welfare state and supra-national bodies such as the European Union and the international human rights regime), such attempts have not yet lost their salience and symbolic value, especially attested to by strong reactions in the countries of settlement.[140] It seems that both sending and receiving states remain caught in a nationalist discourse that does not fundamentally differ from earlier phases in the development of nationalism. One has to be cautious, however, about making facile assumptions about the effectiveness of such attempts. Integration processes of these 'citizens' in the country of settlement take their semi-independent course, as a rule chaining migrants and their descendants more firmly to the country of settlement in the course of time. The conditions under which these processes take place in present liberal-democratic societies do give migrants definitively more choice than immigrants had in the past. This thereby eases their structural integration. Such processes do not necessarily imply a linear cultural, religious or identificational assimilation. Individual and group markers of cultural, ethnic or religious difference may continue to exist or even be revived.[141] In the case of the Turkish group (and comparable groups such as Moroccans) in Western Europe, the combination of social, economic and religious characteristics – as set apart from mainstream society – will likely

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[140] See also Joppke 1999.

[141] As shown in Lucassen & Penninx 1997; Lucassen 2005b and Lucassen et al. 2006.

protract integration process in the structural and the identificational domain more than in the case of the Germans and Poles. Turks and Moroccans, or at least a significant part of these groups, will experience a form of segmented assimilation and remain a visible cultural and religious minority in the next decades. This cannot be primarily explained by efforts of their former nationalist sending states, but by the characteristics of the migrants, the reaction of the receiving society and the interaction between the two.

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